THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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IN MEMORIAM: PAUL SABATIER

By Professor P. Gardner.

THE passing of Professor Paul Sabatier, at the age of 70, has deprived the Church Militant of one of its most striking figures. He must not be confused with M. Auguste Sabatier, the *doyen* of the French Protestants, a more philosophic but less well known writer. Paul Sabatier has published little: but what he has published has been of exceptional value. I need deal with but two of his works, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi* (1893) and a book on the Modernists (1908). Although he was a Protestant pastor, he has done much to bring out the force and beauty of some tendencies which we usually associate with the Roman Church, but which he shows to be part of essential Christianity in all its forms.

Sabatier combined in a high degree two qualities which usually mark two different temperaments, a keenly critical and historical intellect and a warm appreciation of the other-worldliness, the divine passion, of the great heroes of the Church. Nothing could be more methodical and incisive than his criticism of the documents bearing on the life of Francis, which he ranges in order of date and of objective value. He shows how the events of that life were in the course of a century transposed, taking colour from the experiences and struggles of the Francis-

can Society. He details the process by which the element of miracle was introduced more and more plentifully into the life; and the exquisite character of the Saint himself, losing its freshness and beauty, becomes transformed into a conventional pattern of piety—what Rudyard Kipling calls a plaster saint. On the other side, he shows how, when the pious accretions are removed, the figure of Francis shines out more and more brightly, as the one man who in all the ages of Christianity has come nearest to the Founder in those qualities of love, gentleness, self-surrender, in which the Founder is for ever supreme. Of course the juxtaposition more clearly shows how on some sides—in wisdom, in insight, in manliness—the disciple is immeasurably below the Master. But, taken as he really was, there was enough in Francis to secure for him the extreme veneration of all good Christians. It is largely to Sabatier that is due the greatly increased attention paid to St. Francis, not only in the Roman Church but among Anglicans, and even Quakers and Unitarians. The life has been translated into all the languages of Europe, and has everywhere been appreciated.

The procedure by which Sabatier worked his way back to the real St. Francis is remarkably like that by which eminent critics have worked back to Jesus Himself. And that the result in the case of Francis has been to place him on a far loftier pedestal is an earnest of what may be hoped for in the case of his Master, although of course there are between the two lives differences on which I need not dwell. Critical investigation lowers the reputation of all second-rate persons, whether literary or historic; but the few reputations which can stand the test come out all the brighter from the criticism. The esteem of the world for Shakespeare, Dante, Homer has greatly increased in the last century; and the increase has been due to incessant and relentless criticism, combined with appreciation of what is really lovely.

Sabatier's study of St. Francis led him on to a series of most valuable publications of the early Franciscan documents, beginning with the *Speculum Perfectionis*. He originated two societies, one for the publication of literary and religious documents of the Middle Ages, the other the *Société Internationale des Etudes Franciscaines*. He became a referee in all matters

that concerned his hero; one might almost say that he became the high-priest of the Franciscan cult. It was mainly due to his labours that the recent sept-centenary of the death of St. Francis was celebrated in many Christian countries and by various branches of the Church. Many personal honours flowed in upon Paul Sabatier; he became an honorary citizen of Assisi, a Doctor of Oxford, a member of the Royal Academy of Rome. He refused promotion in his own church, because it would have involved a change from French to German nationality; and when Alsace came back to the French nation, he was very appropriately made Professor of Church History in the University of Strasbourg.

The other important book of Sabatier contained his lectures given at London on the Jowett Foundation. It was called *Les Modernistes*, and consisted of an enthusiastic appreciation of the French and Italian Modernist writers; to which was added a French version of the chief documents published against them by the Roman Curia. It is not, of course, a work on the level of the *Life of St. Francis* ; it is much more ephemeral and controversial; but it throws, especially in the Preface, light on Sabatier's own religious views, and the state of affairs in the Roman Church in the first decade of the century.

In fact, after the lapse of twenty years, Sabatier's exposition of Modernism is in a measure out of date. It is for him embodied in M. Loisy, and since that brilliant writer has very much changed his views, Sabatier's panegyric of him seems rather like a scaffolding when the building with which it was connected has fallen. Sabatier, like Loisy himself, was at the time sanguine that the Roman Church would come some part of the way to meet the Modernists: when Pius X set his face against them like a flint, it became evident that liberalism in the Roman Church was out of the question. How far Modernism in that Church may still persist, it is very hard to ascertain; but it is at all events driven under the surface. But Sabatier was not alone in his sanguine views: a much greater theologian, Baron Friedrich von Hügel — 'l'évêque laique des Modernistes,' as M. Sabatier calls him — was also closely allied with Loisy and Tyrrell, and did not expect to see them definitely condemned by the Roman Curia.

Like Father Tyrrell, Sabatier strongly distinguishes between the real Catholic Church, of which he cannot say too much good, and the Papal Curia, which he denounces in no moderate terms. But the Curia completely dominates the Church: no living creature could survive if its skeleton were removed.

There is a curious parallel between M. Loisy's attitude to the Pope and that of the party in the English Church which had hopes of the conferences at Malines. Each had dreams of an accommodation with Rome: but Rome will not hear of any accommodation, but insists on obedience. It is useless to bandy arguments with the master of so many legions.

What strikes an Anglican reader of *Les Modernistes* is Sabatier's entire overlooking of the English position. I ventured at the time to remonstrate with him, and received charming replies: but the logical French way of regarding Catholicism and Protestantism was so deeply rooted in his mind that he could not greatly modify it. For him, Protestantism, in which no doubt he would include the Anglicans, was a purely individualist thing.

> *'Quelle*[1] *que soit la dénomination ou la tendance à laquelle appartient un Protestant, sa mentalité est une mentalité individualiste. Il subit bien la pressure du temps, des circonstances, mais il la réduit au strict minimum; sa passion pour l'indépendance tend à faire de lui un isolé. S'il arrive à comprendre la nécessité de l'association, il la comprendra par son intelligence plus que par son coeur; il est porté à en faire une machine commerciale, quand ce n'est une machine de guerre. Sa maison à lui est toujours plus belle que le temple ou l'église où il se rencontre avec ses frères. Pour le catholique, au contraire, l'église où il se rencontre avec ses frères est la vraie maison, son véritable centre, son foyer.'*

This is evidently a repetition of the conventional Roman view. It is an extreme exaggeration, and does not fit even the Presbyterians, still less the Anglicans. In fact, all through the book Sabatier is unfair to Protestantism: he so much sympathises with his friend Loisy as to think that Modernism can belong only to the Roman Church, which the latter almost identifies with Christianity.

Nevertheless much of what he says of Modernism is well worth attention, and applies to the whole movement:

> *'Le Modernisme*[2] *n'est à aucun degré contenu dans une proposition*

[1] p. 25. [2] p. 20.

intellectuelle, ce n'est ni un système ni une synthèse nouvelle; c'est une orientation. C'est un efflux de sève, de vie, dont on a conscience.'

'Ce qui[3] *fait la force de la position des Modernistes, c'est que leur probité scientifique, bien loin de les conduire à une pure et simple négation religieuse, les amène au contraire à un sol scientifique inébranlable, où la pensée religieuse se développe avec une rigueur, une sérénité, une indépendance, une fierté que nous ne lui avons jamais vu.'*

'Le modernisme[4] *a introduit la notion du relatif dans la philosophie et dans la dogmatique.'*

I might quote many more such passages. But the lasting reputation of M. Sabatier will rest, not on his notions of religious reform and change of outlook, but on his noble and generous appreciation of a great saint, combined with his fearless and relentless criticism of the fictions which have distorted the life of that saint. The truth is not only better based than fiction, but it is, in the case of really fine characters, more beautiful.

P. GARDNER.

BISHOPS, MIRACLES AND ORDINANDS

By the PRINCIPAL OF RIPON HALL, OXFORD.

THE Dean of St. Paul's, in an article entitled 'Changing Religion' in the *Evening Standard* of May 3rd, dealt with the effect which the change from the catastrophic to the evolutionary view of the universe is having on our traditional theology. He wrote:

'Traditional theology believed in a world in which the ordinary course of history had no significance. The natural tendency of mankind was, perhaps, they thought, to get worse. But the history of the universe was for them a cramped drama extending over only a few thousand years, marked by four sudden catastrophes. These were the creation of the universe less than six thousand years ago, the fall of man, the redemption of mankind through the Incarnation, and the final destruction of the universe, which might be expected in the near future.

The conception of miracle belongs to a catastrophic, not to an evolutionary, scheme of the world's history, and many of our difficulties with traditional theology arise from the fact that our theology was constructed to agree with a catastrophic philosophy of history, whereas we all believe in evolution.

It is quite possible to bring the Christian revelation under an evolutionary scheme; the Fourth Gospel gives us more than a hint how this may be done. But our religion is passing through a critical

[3] p. xxxiv. [4] p. xxviii.

transition, so that we cannot be surprised if it shows signs of temporary weakness. This weakness is most apparent in those bodies which are trying to face the situation and adjust themselves to it. The Die-hards, for the time being, are in an easier position, rejecting the new knowledge and the new way of looking at the world altogether. But faith and courage point to a more worthy attitude, which will justify itself in time.

Only, if we are ready to accept the scientific view of the universe, as in process of evolution by regular laws, we must not give way to fatalism. If, as Bacon said, nature is conquered only by obeying her, it is equally true that she is obeyed only by conquering her. Nature is a friendly opponent, with whom we have to wrestle, like Jacob, till the dawn of day, and who will yield her secret and her blessing only to him who has struggled manfully with her. This is a good world, because it needs us to make it better.

"Work out your own salvation, for it is God that worketh in you." We cannot get beyond this paradox. Faith and grace are the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Never and nowhere can we say where nature leaves off and supernature begins.'

The Dean also pointed out in the same article that the English bishops are not uninfluenced by this changed outlook, and that this is apparent in their treatment of ordinands who share it. Of this he wrote as follows:

'It is tacitly admitted that the old "argument from miracle and prophecy" can no longer be used. I do not mean that a clergyman may stand in the pulpit and proclaim that he does not accept the miracles in the Creeds; but when a young man tells his bishop that his belief in the divinity of Christ is independent of the dogmas about the Virgin Birth and the bodily Resurrection, very few bishops hesitate to ordain him. This is one of the changes which have come about silently and gradually. The centre of gravity in religious belief has shifted very considerably, and the Church is accepting the change.'

The day after the appearance of the Dean's article, the *Evening Standard* published a letter from the Bishop of London criticizing the Dean's statement with reference to the episcopal treatment of ordinands. The Bishop's criticism is as follows:

'He (the Dean) says that "when a young man tells his bishop that his belief in the Divinity of Christ is *independent of* the dogmas about the Virgin Birth and the Bodily Resurrection, very few bishops hesitate to ordain him."

Now there is a sense in which this may be true. We all admit that the *moral* argument is the strongest of all. Jesus Christ's claims, combined with His character, form a stronger argument for His Divinity than any miracle.

Buy if my friend the Dean means that the bishops don't think it matters whether a candidate for Holy Orders believes that Jesus Christ's body saw corruption in the grave, and that there was no "empty tomb," then he is absolutely and entirely wrong.

> I do not know many things better than the versatile Dean, but I claim to know more about the opinions and views of the bishops, as I hear them expressed a great deal oftener than he does, both in public and private conference, and whatever the deans may have done the bishops have not given up their belief in miracles.'

This conflict of opinion between the Bishop and the Dean, in view of the shortage of ordinands, especially ordinands of good mental qualifications, is of some importance. Since the Bishop of London can claim without presumption to know more than the Dean of St. Paul's about the attitude of the English bishops towards ordinands in this matter of 'the miracles in the Creeds,' perhaps a Principal of a theological college may claim without presumption to know more of the matter than even the Bishop of London. The situation as I know it may be summarized as follows.

There are a number of English diocesan bishops who neither themselves nor through their examining chaplains trouble to elicit from candidates their views on this difficult and controversial issue. They let sleeping dogs lie, and one cannot but feel that they are wise in doing so. Where, however, their candidates have felt conscientiously bound to confess their inability to profess belief in the historical character of 'the miracles in the Creeds,' these Bishops have ordained these candidates without apparent misgiving, and without attempting either to secure an alteration in the views of the candidate or to treat those views as prejudices begotten of ignorance and inexperience. In short, they have made no fuss.

There are, however, a large number of our English bishops in another class. They do make a good deal of fuss, but they finally ordain the candidate. The Bishop of London comes in this class. He writes:

> 'With regard to the Virgin Birth, it is quite true that it stands on a different level of evidence from the Resurrection, but it is part of the age-long faith of the Church, and it is a serious thing to ordain a young man who is going twice a day to lead a congregation with the words in the Creed, "born of the Virgin Mary," if he does not believe it. I myself hesitate to "put a pistol to the head" of a young man fighting his way through doubts and difficulties, and help him all I can, and on two occasions in twenty-six years have ordained a man who felt great difficulty on this particular point, feeling sure that future study would enlarge his view; and in one case I know, and in both cases I believe, my trust was justified.'

I know of two cases, and I think of three, within the last seven years where the Bishop of London has ordained men who felt the 'great difficulty' of which the Bishop writes, and no alteration has since taken place in their views. One of the men had taken First Class Honours in Theology and was a Doctor of Philosophy, and knew a good deal more about historical theology than the bishop who ordained him.

I will, however, cite three cases, no one of which concerns the Bishop of London, but all occurring within the last six months, to illustrate the sort of thing that takes place to-day in Church circles.

(1) A bishop, looking over a candidate's examination papers done for Deacon's Orders, is alarmed to see that he does not hold the traditional view of 'the miracles in the Creed.' He sends for the candidate and tells him of his alarm. The candidate tells the vicar to whom it was arranged that he should go for his first curacy. The vicar, who holds an important parish to which he has recently been presented by the bishop himself, tells the Bishop that his own views agree entirely with those of the candidate. The bishop then ordains the candidate.

(2) A bishop interviews one of his diocesan ordinands and learns that the candidate cannot affirm his belief in the historical character of the Virgin Birth. He tells the candidate to think it over and to write him a full statement of his reasons for his difficulty. The candidate consults his Principal and does so. The bishop (himself no scholar) submits the candidate's *apologia* to an eminent theologian. Apparently the bishop also reads some of the authorities cited by the candidate. The bishop then has a second interview with the candidate. The result may best be given in the candidate's letter to the Principal of his theological college :

> 'Thank you very much for the advice and help you accorded me on the question of the Virgin Birth and my disagreement with my bishop.
>
> The matter has been satisfactorily settled. His Lordship does not now demand any specific assent to the doctrine nor does he suggest that I should give any positive teaching with regard to it.
>
> I wrote him a lengthy paper stating my position generally, and making clear my attitude towards the Virgin Birth. After due consideration he said he refused to take my position seriously, and expressed his conviction that after some experience of parochial work my views would be considerably modified. He consented to ordain me.'

(3) A bishop looking through a candidate's examination papers to see whether he knew enough Greek, came across a statement that he felt that the main objection to the Virgin Birth was not the weakness of the historical evidence for it, but that it conflicted seriously with the orthodox doctrine of the perfection of the Saviour's manhood. The bishop sent for the candidate and told him how serious he considered this departure from traditional theology to be, but he did not say that he would not ordain him. The candidate has not yet been ordained, because he has not yet completed the course of study required to qualify for Holy Orders.

Of course, it would be possible to cite a number of other cases very much in line with these three, but not quite so recent.

There may be English bishops who will not ordain candidates who do not believe in the historical character of 'the miracles in the Creeds,' but they are not numerous and they are not personally important. As a general rule, if a candidate be well-bred and well-educated, if he be manifestly and sincerely Christian in his character, conduct, and spirit, I much doubt whether there is a bishop on the English Bench who would definitely reject him, even though he deplored his aberration from traditionalism.

My own experience therefore leads me to regard the Dean of St. Paul's statement as reflecting more correctly the real situation than the Bishop of London's criticism of it.

There is another of the Bishop's remarks which demands comment. The Bishop writes :

> 'It is a serious thing to ordain a young man who is going twice a day to lead a congregation with the words in the Creed, "born of the Virgin Mary," if he does not believe it.'

It is a serious thing even though the ordinand should regard the clause as inserted in the Creed to affirm the reality of Christ's human nature and not the virginity of His mother. Would it not be much better not to recite the Apostles' Creed in the daily services, and to use at the Eucharist the Nicene Creed in its original form, which contained no reference to the Virgin Birth?

A GREAT CHRISTIAN STATESMAN

By Nowell Smith.

THE Making of a State, by President Masaryk, is a rather formidable and expensive volume.* As I had long been interested in President Masaryk and the remarkable resurrection of Bohemia, I took the first opportunity I could of reading the book. Although I have no belief in the separation of religion from politics or any other human activity, and should certainly not have been surprised to find matters of religious interest in a history of the resurrection of the country of John Hus: yet I confess that I did not anticipate what I actually did find—the most successful statesman and diplomatist of modern times expressing his political philosophy in the terms and in the name of Jesus Christ without the slightest affectation or apology.

> 'Spiritual absolutism, the various forms of Caesaro-Papism and of temporal absolutism by which religion has been misused, will give place to a more exalted morality, a higher degree of humanity, and a loftier religion which will freely guide the whole of public life. The ideal is Jesus, not Caesar. I say it is our task to make realities of the religion and ethics of Jesus, of His pure and immaculate religion of humanity. He saw in the love of God and of one's neighbours the fulfilment of the whole Law and the Prophets, the foundations of religion and morality. All else is accessory. The spiritual absolutism that shared temporal rule with the State was evil. It was the spirit of the Roman Empire. Julius Caesar, like Augustus and his successors, attached high importance to moral and religious reform; but modern man is no longer satisfied with a religion that the State dictates for political reasons. Therefore we need Jesus, not Caesar.' (p. 404.)
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> 'The relationship of religion to political and practical life I sum up in the command that we should seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness and that all other things shall be added to us. A man and a people religiously convinced, a nation steadfastly determined to realize its ideals, will always reach their goal. This I have learned from life; this too is the teaching of our own history and that of all nations.' (p. 437.)
>
> 'In our Democratic Republic, freedom of conscience and toleration must not merely be codified but realized in every domain of public life. Palacky's philosophical interpretation of our history esteems the Bohemian Brotherhood as its consummation. The Father of our

**The Making of a State*, by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic; an English version, arranged and prepared with an introduction, by Henry Wickham Steed. George Allen & Unwin. 21/- net. (1927).

> Nation[1] and our historical past alike enjoin upon us pure Christianity, the teaching of Jesus and His law of life. Democracy is the political form of the humane ideal.' (p. 441 : the last words of the book.)

These quotations are perhaps not very striking apart from their context and from a knowledge and recollection of what the author has done. They might command our assent in a sermon or a treatise. The sentiments they express are indeed commonplaces of theory. But in how many of the numberless *Memoirs* published by statesmen and diplomatists who took part in the World War can we read this sort of thing? And—a very pertinent question—how many statesmen or diplomatists have published their memoirs without finding it necessary to explain, defend, deny failures? President Masaryk is the one actor of first-rate importance in that great world drama who played his part successfully from start to finish,—and is doing so still. When the war broke out, he, a Professor of the University of Prague and a Czech member of the Austrian Parliament, made up his mind that Bohemia must seize the opportunity to regain its independence. He thought out his plan with extraordinary foresight and pursued it with extraordinary courage and tenacity. With the aid of a few devoted disciples and of his wonderful influence over the Czech national spirit, he kept alive and at the same time guided and saved from premature outbreaks the revolutionary fervours of his people, raised armies of about 180,000 men from Czech colonists and prisoners-of-war in foreign countries, persuaded the Governments of all the Allies to recognize Czechoslovakia as an actual State and to admit its plenipotentiaries on equal terms to the Armistice negotiations, and finally has succeeded, in the face of all the difficult and delicate problems besetting a composite State in the very middle of Europe, in establishing an orderly, peaceable, tolerant Republic which in these feverish years since the War has been remarkable for the small amount of attention it has attracted from the purveyors of news and the large amount from investors of capital. In the course of pursuing his great object Masaryk was continually engaged, tactfully, modestly, behind the scenes, but firmly and persistently, teaching rulers and statesmen their job. Few if any of them had more than that superficial 'work-

[1] Francis Palacký (1798-1876), the foremost historian of Bohemia and a leader in the national revival; often called 'The Father of the Nation.'

ing' knowledge of anything outside their immediate sphere of domestic politics, which just enables politicians to live from hand to mouth in ordinary times, but which is paralyzed in the face of the great crises which their ignorance is always preparing. While it was a question of stimulating the warlike spirit, appeals to justice and patriotism and denunciations of the enemy flowed the more readily for not being overcharged with solid fact or reasonings: but when it came to the question of what to do, if and when the war should be won, even the self-confidence of politicians felt in need of some support from knowledge and thoughtfulness. Hence the unusual value suddenly put upon 'professors' *et id genus omne*, usually objects merely of dislike to politicians and other 'practical' men. With all the world mixed up in a war, you never knew when you might not want to know where Teschen was, or whether there was any difference between Slovaks and Slovenes, Lithuanians and Letts.

But, as Masaryk says in another connexion (p. 291), 'there are professors and professors'; and without disparaging the work of the *intelligentsia* all over the world, which after all alone prevents Governments making more of a mess of things than they actually do, we may observe that Masaryk was before the war an exceptional professor and during the war—what no professor, not even President Wilson, was—a free agent, responsible only to his own conscience. By going into exile he repudiated his Austrian citizenship, and the State of which he was soon to become the First Citizen was not yet in being. He was first, in fact, Dictator of himself and his dream; then tacitly Dictator of the helpers he gathered round him and the Czechs in various countries who followed his lead;[2] then on March 20th, 1917, proclaimed Dictator by the Czech troops in Russia; then acknowledged by foreign Powers in October, 1918, as President of the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia; finally, on November 14th of that year, elected President of the Republic at Prague, which city he entered again on December 21st after an exile of just four years.

These are, very briefly, a few of the salient facts which lead me to claim that such utterances as those quoted above are more

[2] See especially pp. 87, 88, 89.

noteworthy than they would be from the pen or on the lips of men, however wise and good, who have neither the power nor the trial of putting them to the test of action on the world's stage and at constant risk of their lives. It would be impossible within my limits to do any sort of justice to the intrinsic interest of this book, whether as a first-hand account of many of the most important moments of the war, and of the author's experiences, especially in Russia during the Bolshevist revolution, or as a series of appreciations of the moral and intellectual conditions of England, America, France, Russia and Germany, or finally—what it is the purpose of this article to call attention to—as the record, all the more impressive because desultory, incidental and totally free from 'apologetic,' of the writer's own character and outlook. In regard to this last aspect of the book, however, I will attempt to give some slight indications.

Masaryk's creed, personal and political—and to him there is no distinction[3]—is summed up in the title of his last chapter, 'Democracy and Humanity.' Both words are unfashionable, and in England it has for some time been the cheapest method of self-assertion to sneer at these and similar 'Victorian' illusions. Unlike our arm-chair cynics, Masaryk has lived through all those phases of life the mere contemplation of which does almost inevitably make one cynical: and his fire-tried faith in democracy and humanity is only one more proof of the truth that actual life, the actual struggle with 'the world, the flesh, and the devil,' is the only way of salvation from cynicism and disillusionment. Masaryk started life as a coachman's son and worked his way up to a professorship; he incurred odium by espousing unpopular causes; he entered politics and earned the implacable hatred of the Austrian bureaucracy by exposing the forgeries in the Friedjung case; he was present at Petrograd, at Moscow, and at Kieff at the moment of the actual Bolshevist outbreak in each of those cities, and not only went in immediate danger of his life, but saw such horrible sights that even now it seems to him like a nightmare[4]; he lived throughout the war

[3] *Cf.* p. 409: 'Between morality on a big scale and on a small there is no distinction. It is a false notion that political men need take no thought of ethical principles when the interest of the State is involved. A man who lies and deceives in public life will be a liar and deceiver in private life.'

[4] p. 170.

the life of a conspirator, dealing, mostly in secret, with all sorts of politicians, journalists, financiers, and using one and all for the furtherance of his own self-chosen purpose; that is to say, that he in his own person experienced throughout his career everything that could be expected to produce a cynical distrust of human nature: yet his creed is 'democracy and humanity.' He is as far removed as possible from either fanaticism or sentimentalism. While keeping the ultimate goal in sight, he does not fail to explore each section of his route as he comes to it, or to do what is feasible at a given moment even if it is not what he had hoped.

> 'One thing was clear,' he writes; 'despite science and philosophy, reason and wisdom, prudence and foresight, the lives of men and of peoples run, in large measure, otherwise than they will and wish. Still, there is in them a logic which they perceive retrospectively. The efforts and plans of the most gifted political leaders, of the men who make history, reveal themselves as *vaticinatio ex eventu.*'

He quotes the hackneyed lines from 'Hamlet'—but beginning, more intelligently than we so often do, with the immediate context:

> 'Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
> When our deep plots do pall; and that should teach us
> There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will;'

and goes on:

> 'Yet a belief that Providence watches over us and the world is no reason for fatalistic inactivity but rather for optimistic concentration of effort, for a strict resolution to work determinedly, to work for an idea. Only thus are we entitled to expect the so-called "lucky accident" that springs from the inner logic of life and history, and to trust in God's help.'[5] 'An observant public man and practical politician soon sees that few things are new in the world and that he brings little that is new into it. . . . Perhaps everyone would like to be a small Napoleon, but normal men like equally to obey, and obey gladly. Above all, patience is necessary, everywhere, in everything, and especially in politics. Without patience there is no true democracy. A democrat may be dissatisfied, uneasy, but he must not be impatient. Patience is a pledge of humaneness.'[6]

Everything is on this sober, steady note. Masaryk shows extraordinary familiarity with the literature, up to the very latest books, of all the principal countries of Europe and of the U.S.A. He analyses national character, philosophical and

[5] pp. 288, 289. [6] p. 296.

religious influences, with the calm judgment of an expert and the sympathetic penetration of a man of action. He is so sensible that the mere literary critic might very likely dismiss him as Philistine and commonplace, not realizing how charged with real experience and hard-won knowledge and intensity of purpose is this unpretentious record and this unconscious revelation of a very great man. I have found it impossible in reading and re-reading his book not to be reminded over and over again of Plato's 'philosopher-king,' and to wonder whether there has ever been anything so like an embodiment of his idea as in Masaryk, the re-creator and guide of Czechoslovakia. I cannot think of another instance in which 'political power and philosophy' have combined[7] in the person of one man who could be called the ruler of a state. Marcus Aurelius is of course the stock example, but usually to point the moral that the combination is impracticable. Noble as Marcus Aurelius was, the Emperor and the Stoic could never fuse in him. His Stoicism enabled him to sit through the shows of the Circus inattentive to the barbarism which he despised; it made him a far more enlightened and more conscientious Emperor than most autocrats before or since. But his philosophy was his refuge, his medicine, his personal armour; it was not and could not be the active and guiding principle of his policy and rule. The Roman Empire — a type of 'State' such as Plato could not foresee — was not amenable to the rule of a philosopher-king. In Bohemia in our day there were the conditions, the occasion and the man, meeting for once. But here comes in the significant difference between Masaryk and the Platonic philosopher-king, as also between Masaryk and anyone who is a Dictator in spirit. Masaryk is a Christian leader. Called to a virtual dictatorship of a people struggling to be free, he has never lost sight of the true Christian view of leadership or the true Christian view of humanity which that implies. He has no illusions about the need of leadership in a democracy: 'under popular government all have a right to take the initiative, all are called upon to act, all are responsible — though, even in democracy, many are called and few are chosen.'[8] And it is evident that his most

[7] Plato's *Republic*, Bk. V, 473, etc.

[8] p. 421.

serious anxiety is the question whether the bulk of the people can be educated up to the necessary standard of political, which in his view is necessarily moral, wisdom.

> 'Semi-education, as a transitional phase of our period of transition from theocracy to democracy, is the peculiar curse of our society and our era.' [9]

But he will have no short cuts, such as absolutism, whether ecclesiastical or political, always attempts.

> 'I defend democracy against dictatorial absolutism, whether the right to dictate be claimed by the proletariate, the State, or the Church. . . . The most scientific policy depends upon experience and induction. It can claim no infallibility. It offers no eternal truths and can form no warrant for absolutism.' [10]

Let me end with one more extract, only premising that extracts give a very poor idea of the living texture of this book.

> 'Unlike Chelcicky,[11] I do not belittle the outward authority of the State, but I cannot deify it and its power. When I took upon myself the obligations of the Presidential office, well knowing what my daily administrative tasks would be, it was clear to me that no State or policy can prosper unless the groundwork be moral. As St. Paul wrote at the beginning of the 4th chapter of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: "Therefore seeing we have this Ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully; but by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." That is the programme of the Republic and of Democracy *sub specie aeternitatis*.' [12]

[9] p. 399.

[10] p. 417.

[11] A disciple of John Hus and founder of the Bohemian Brotherhood in the fifteenth century.

[12] p. 407.

JERUSALEM, 1928

By Charles E. Raven, D.D.

MUCH has already been written, and in the next few months far more will follow, about the meeting of the International Missionary Council on the Mount of Olives from March 26th till April 8th, 1928. Its situation, its membership, its procedure, its findings, its influence—these are already being discussed with interest; and it would be out of place to re-tell the story here. But in the course of the Conference there emerged an issue of such gravity for the Church of England and of such significance for readers of *The Modern Churchman* that an article, however hastily composed, should appear at the earliest moment.

Jerusalem is a fitting place for a crisis, and Holy Week is inevitably linked with thoughts of God's judgment. As Good Friday drew nearer, the Anglican delegates at the Council became aware that for them, more than for any others, the days were literally critical, that their Communion was facing and would have to face an issue of quite supreme importance, and that every hour was helping not only to emphasize the gravity of the situation, but to define its character. Important as were many of the decisions that the Council had to take, far-reaching as will be their results, for us, and through us for the whole Church of Christ, one single question became overwhelmingly insistent. Other matters can be discussed at leisure hereafter: here is a subject of such urgency that we must face it at once.

The early days of the Conference gave us two preparatory lessons: first, that the missionary task of the Church had entered upon a new period, and, secondly, that in all the Asiatic countries, and to a large extent in Africa also, nationalism was the dominant feature of the situation. The days of missionary pioneering are over: the West is no longer alone in carrying its faith to a heathen world: in China and Korea and Japan, in India and Persia and among the African peoples, indigenous churches are coming into being: the missionary is welcomed by these churches if he will take his place as a partner and on equal

terms: the period of tutelage is finished. In all these areas nationalist feeling is intense: it has much that is aggressive, much that is one-sided and unfair in its outlook: but if our professions towards the coloured peoples are sincere, we are working in order to fit them for self-government, and should welcome the signs of their coming of age. They are not yet ready for full self-determination—that seems clear: but if they are to develop independence and to escape embitterment, we must meet their demands with sympathy and patience, and be ready to foster wherever possible aspirations which we have ourselves created.

These two lessons reveal to us our problem. Here are the indigenous churches eager to build up a strong Christian life which shall be appropriate to racial temperament and adjusted to all that is good in native ways of life. No one with any vision of the universality of the Gospel would wish the Christianity of China or India to be a pallid imitation of that of Britain or the United States. We believe that these ancient civilizations have their own distinctive contribution to make to the building up of the Body of Christ. We have given them what we can; they must enshrine the Spirit in an organization of doctrine, cultus, and order appropriate to their own genius. We cannot expect that Anglican or Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist models will be slavishly copied. The West gave to Christianity the garb of Graeco-Roman civilization: in the East, Christ will receive a new raiment appropriate to His Eastern children.

Furthermore, if the Church is to influence the new national self-consciousness, it must be linked up, as an integral element in them, with the lives of the nations. A Christianity which is looked upon as the possession of the white races and of a few Europeanized converts will be regarded simply as an exotic; indeed, will be rejected as part of the white man's yoke. A truly international religion which gave the native churches a sense of unity in a world-wide discipleship would do much to counteract the exaggerated and divisive tendencies of nationalism. But a Church which appears as a number of isolated and alien sects will only repel. If an indigenous church is necessary that we may receive enrichment from the qualities of other civilizations, it is not less powerfully demanded by the practical necessities

of the situation. Such a church is not a dim, far-off dream : it is actually in process of birth, and its appearance cannot, and will not, be delayed.

Hence for us Anglicans there is a crisis over re-union. The desire for united national churches is overwhelming and is already being fulfilled. The other denominations, practically without exception, are ready and eager to combine. For them the matter is simply one of adjustment. Like ourselves they have worked for the day when their missions could point to a Church of India, or of China, as the crown of their efforts. They are seeing the fulfilment of their hopes, and are confident that such churches will command an influence out of all proportion greater than separate missionary bodies can exert.

Yet (and here is the element which adds poignancy to the situation) they are looking with generous affection to the Anglican Communion and inviting it to take its full share with them. They would, I believe, be willing to accept episcopacy if it did not involve the re-ordination of existing ministers : at least they would receive any proposals on our part with sympathy and an intense desire to carry us with them. Certainly at Jerusalem they treated our delegates with the most signal kindliness, and showed the keenest appreciation of our difficulties. But it is obvious that they cannot check or delay the movement towards union beyond the next Lambeth Conference. If our bishops can only meet the situation by urging patience, they will be compelled to go forward without us.

This, then, is the crisis. If the Lambeth Conference consents to sanction schemes for unity like that which Bishop Linton wishes to accept for Persia, the Anglican Communion could contribute an invaluable element to the growth of the younger churches : it would be certain of the warmest welcome and of an infinite opportunity. If we are unable to agree to changes and insist upon maintaining our isolation, then one of two events will follow. Either our missionaries will break away from the home church and throw in their lot with the church of their adopted land, or the Anglican missions will be left as small, foreign and separated bodies in countries where churches representative of non-Roman Christendom and of the indigenous Christianity of the native peoples are sweeping forward to

free and splendid achievement. For myself, I believe that the majority of our best missionaries will prefer schism to spiritual starvation; and I shall be surprised if they do not receive the support of the strongest missionary societies of this country.

It is difficult to write of such an issue in a way that will not seem exaggerated to those who did not share the experience at Jerusalem. For us who were in it the whole Conference seemed to be leading inevitably to a 'day of judgment.' We saw looming nearer and more tremendous the decision that our leaders would have to face—a decision which would involve us all, and all for which we have worked and prayed. I have not overstated the magnitude of the issue; until it arose, I had no conception of its scale or of its urgency. Whatever may be the difficulties of any general and immediate re-union, however important it may be for us at home to move with patience and slowly, a situation has arisen in Asia and Africa in which delay or inaction are impossible except at the cost of condemning our mission-work to frustration. We must accept re-union in 1930, or stand condemned.

Can we not rather look at it from the other side? Here is an opportunity, coming sooner than we had dreamed, for seeing the fulfilment of the first phase of missionary endeavour, for enabling the religious genius of other countries to make a free contribution to the development of Christianity, for watching the children of the family go out to their own careers. We cannot lay upon them the evil burden of our sectarianism: let us rejoice that they are able to take upon them their own responsibilities, to plan out their own arrangements, to take their full part in the world-wide adventure of the Cross. And, like wise parents, let us not falsify our work hitherto by refusing, now that its first phase is over, to recognize that these younger members of the family must be at liberty to shape, under God, their own destinies in His service.

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

By the Rev. C. J. Wright, B.D.

THE problem of the relation of Christianity to History is at the present time exercising very considerably the minds both of those Christians who have imbibed the spirit of modern historical enquiry and of those historians who would fain be Christians. Unfortunately, so many questions are here entwined that it is a by no means easy task to unravel them. And they, in their intricate inter-relation and delicate connectedness, constitute the acute problems at issue. It is not too difficult to be an historian, difficult and delicate as is his task. Nor is it too difficult to have personal, experiential acquaintance with what Christianity really is, although many be the speculative and ethical difficulties which beset the interior life. But to be both historian and Christian is to demand what not all can supply, *viz.*, a considerable measure of philosophic faculty, for it is by it alone that any kind of harmony can be attained within the personality.

Doubtless the two primary questions are, What *is* History? and What *is* Christianity? Only when some clear and consistent way of regarding these has been reached is it possible to discuss in any intelligent and intelligible fashion their relation.

What, then, is History? This, unfortunately, is a term which is used in two distinct senses, two senses which are frequently in discussion confused to the point of confusion becoming worse confounded. History may mean either *what has happened in the past* or *the record of what has happened in the past.*[1] It would be well, I think, to confine the term to-day to the former use, though it is easy to see how difficult, and indeed almost unavoidable, is the passage from one meaning to the other. When, for example, we speak of *the history* of England, we mean the events that have happened in the life of the nation we know as such. Since, however, we were not present when all these events occurred, we can only speak with any concrete

[1] As illustrating these two uses, I take the following from a recent leading article in *The Times*. One paragraph speaks of the 'question as to the way in which history ought to be written.' Later it is said, 'History must be fair.'

meaning of that history if we have before us a record, or what purports to be a record, of that history. In other words, we can only know history through a record. This is true of every type of history, whether it be geological history, or stellar history, or any other branch of history. Thus for geological history our record for perusal is the earth itself, and for astronomical history the whole stellar universe. In the case of that branch of history which usually monopolizes the term, our chief record is the written book. Thus the record itself becomes the history, and the history the record. Now this two-fold meaning would cause no confusion in discussion if the record always corresponded exactly with the reality it recorded. But inasmuch as this is seldom, if ever, so, it is easy to see how ambiguous may be a discussion of the relation of *history* to any other specific branch of knowledge or of reality. Of the same period of time we may have, not one, but a hundred 'histories,' differing in most important respects from one another. Let, for example, certain American records of the American War of Independence be read alongside certain British records of that same war. Many of the statements of fact will be found to be the same, but when the suppressions, the exaggerations, the divergent emphases, the attribution of conflicting motives are duly noted there is no longer cause for surprise that an American and a British schoolboy each derive considerable patriotic gratification from the same history.

What, further, is Christianity? Obviously it is impossible to answer this question to the satisfaction of the millions of people who call themselves Christians. Without, however, letting ourselves be brought to a standstill in the discussion by the bewildering diversity of views at this point, let us endeavour to elucidate the various modes of regarding Christianity. Roughly speaking, there are two main types of mind, what we may call the authoritarian and what we may call the experiential. Corresponding thereto, there are two main ways in which Christians tend to regard their religion.

First, it may be regarded as *what may be recorded in historical fashion*. This general sense of the term covers that whole movement of thought, feeling and endeavour which had its beginning, or shall we say its inspiration, in the personal

thought, feeling, and endeavour of Jesus, the Christ. Christianity, so regarded, is thus itself history : it covers all that happened in the life of Jesus, all that happened in the corporate life of those who have called themselves His followers, including their cultus, their organization, their doctrinal discussions, disputations and conclusions, their personal and social morality. To write a 'history' of this history is obviously impossible for any one mind, and probably impossible for any company of minds. The historian of Christianity must do what the scientist does, namely, abstract from the whole reality which is his province that with which he has the capacity or the opportunity to deal, or which he can conclude within formula or law. His historical record is thus for ever partial, devoted to a mere section of the whole reality. Further, it is well to remember, his record is a description, and not a prescription; it says nothing about what *had to be*, or what *must be*, but only about what *was*, or what *is*.

It is obvious that Christianity, so conceived, becomes the precise equivalent of what may be called *Christian History*, or, to use an ambiguous phrase, *the history of Christianity*. If anyone were able to set forth a record of all that has happened in the past in that restricted sphere of this world covered by the lives of all who have called themselves Christian, *there* would be found Christianity. I do not wish, of course, to suggest that anyone, with consistency, so regards Christianity. Christians belonging whether to the various sects or to the several schools of thought which together compose this Christianity frequently regard their religion as including only that part of this history which they, in their several manners, declare to be *true* Christianity, the other parts being regarded as determined by non-Christian factors. Nevertheless I do suggest that this mode of regarding Christianity, which I would call either the *historical* or the *authoritarian* if these adjectives were not so ambiguous, is a distinct *genus*, differences whether of denomination or of theological statement constituting the several *species* originating from or together constituting that *genus*.

Secondly, Christianity may be regarded as a term which each individual Christian can employ to describe the personal beliefs, experiences and activities which constitute to him his religion. The essence of this mode of regarding Christianity

is that its content is found in *personal experience* and not, as distinguished from the former mode, in the experience of those who have gone. Christianity is not a history, it is an experience —an insight, a deliverance, a 'salvation' if you will, a mode of life. Those who so know their religion do not, of course, deny that this experience has been *historically meditated*, that, in other words, it never could have been theirs without those who have gone. But they assert that Christianity is a *religion* and not a *theology*, an experience and not an institution, a knowledge and not a dogma, a life and not a creed. An advocate of this personal way of regarding Christianity might point out that it is abstractly possible to have intellectual acquaintance with its whole history, to be conversant with every event in the life of Jesus and in the life and thought of the several branches of the Church, to give assent to some or to all dogmatic or doctrinal statements, and yet to be without any interior or personal knowledge of what Christianity is. To which it might, doubtless, be replied that such a plea would seem to involve that Christianity is not *one* religion, but as many religions as there are Christians. Both these statements contain a truth : as to the conclusion to which they all point, that remains for elucidation. Suffice it for the moment to say that the present writer cannot regard it as possible to be a Christian by proxy. While deeply conscious of indebtedness to the rich heritage of thought and experience mediated through each successive generation of Christians, he cannot regard acquiescence in the beliefs or in any other of the institutional requirements of the past as constituting him a Christian, but only an inner certitude, a personal knowledge, an interior conviction, an immediate awareness of the reality that past Christians *in*, though not *by*, themselves possessed.

These considerations or elucidations may perhaps throw light on such seemingly contradictory assertions as the following, which I cull almost at random from recent theological literature. 'I must confess,' says a modern Christian historian, 'that I cannot believe in any very direct connection between history and the essence of religion.' The same writer adds, in honest and faithful conclusion from his standpoint : 'I feel bound to record my personal conviction that the essence of

Christianity is independent even of the personal existence of Jesus himself'—this while declaring that the conclusions of the Christ-myth theorists seem to him 'foolish and superficial.'[2] In contrast with this attitude, let me cite a few of the assertions exemplifying the familiar position taken by the late Baron von Hügel. Determinedly and with great subtlety he argued against those to whom the principles, the ideas, of Christianity 'remain true, even if every one of the alleged happenings and historical facts turned out to be pure creations of the imagination, incorporating not what is nor what was, but what ought to be, and the deepest note in the human soul, this oughtness.' This attitude he held to be 'impossible and ruinous.'[3] 'The religion of the Incarnation,' he elsewhere said, 'will be able consistently to despise Happenings, however lowly, and the study of Happenings, however minute, only if and when it does not sufficiently realize its own abiding implications and requirements, its rootedness in the Childhood at Nazareth and in the Cross on Calvary.'[4] Yet elsewhere, the same writer distinguished the following two positions with regard to Historical Happenings (apart from the orthodox position that the Church knows infallibly such 'Factual Happenings'): First, that *some* Historical Happenings are necessary to Christianity; and second, that *no* Historical Happening is essential to Christianity. The first of these positions, needless to say, he strongly maintained.[5]

Perhaps it is in commenting on these two positions that our own may be most clearly elucidated. This is the more *economical* mode of investigation and declaration, as it seems to us, inasmuch as the *third* position, which has been in apologetic literature the prevailing one — namely, that Inspiration, whether of Bible as in the case of Protestants, or of Bible and Church as in the case of 'Catholics,' guaranteed the Happenings—is now definitely laid aside. No serious investigator of Christian History can utilise a mechanico-supernatural conception of Inspiration, or a similar conception of Institutional Infallibility, to ensure or establish the historicity of recorded events. Few, if any, can seriously believe that those who in

[2] G. G. Coulton in *The Modern Churchman* for September, 1920.
[3] *Essays and Addresses*, 2nd Series, p. 106.
[4] *Essays and Addresses*, 1st Series, p. xvi.
[5] *Letters*, p. 348.

every generation, or in any specific generation, have had especial insight into spiritual reality, especial sensitiveness to Divine leading, or that especial awareness which we can only call 'Communion with God,' were thereby, in their function as narrators, delivered from the pains and perplexities of historical enquiry and discrimination. Neither spirituality nor goodness is a guarantee of scientific exactitude. More often, let it be frankly said, these gifts are accompanied with an unconcern for cautious precision of observation, of investigation and statement, which historical science requires. Leaving that consideration aside, it remains true that the investigation of Christian History must be conducted on the same principles as the investigation of any other branch of history. Historical enquiry has not two methods, a Christian and a non-Christian, but only one. Conclusions cannot be *a priori* assured, no matter how cherished may be the events or the beliefs at stake. If this be granted, then it becomes apparent, let it be said in passing, that the attitude of theological thinkers, if there be such, to whom Christianity is inseparable from historical events, and yet who either fear or anathematize modern historical enquiry, is an attitude of scepticism, latent in the first case, manifest in the second.

In support of the former view it may be emphasized, as already maintained, that religion is nothing if it is not personal. The insights, the beliefs, the experiences of former Christians which the latter view objectifies in a historical essential were, likewise, *personal* insights, *personal* beliefs, *personal* experiences. Even if a historical retreat be made to the fount, to our Lord Himself, it cannot be disputed that religion to Him was His own personal insight, belief, experience. The supremacy, the uniqueness of that personal experience, mediated to us by history, may lead us to regard it, as most Christians do, as an objective content on which we, as personal Christians, may rest our faith, and from which we, in a sense, derive our insights. Nevertheless, if I may put it so, the experience is only ours if it *is* ours. That is, I cannot be a Christian by saying I believe any recorded event to have happened, even if that recorded event be the existence, the personal insight into reality and truth, the personal sublimity of ethical attitude and endeavour

of Jesus, the Christ. I am only a Christian if His insight becomes, in a measure, my own, His perception of spiritual reality personally mine, His 'spirit' or ethical attitude likewise my own. It is by my own fruits that I am known, and not by His; by my own beliefs, and not by His, that I become even His 'follower.' Doubtless to regard the essence of personal Christianity as the assent, authoritatively imposed, to an objective content, to a historical past, or to an institutional embodiment of that content and of that past, is to make possible a speedy, though in the end delusive, expansion. These facile concessions, which have always commended themselves to the wisdom of this world (so strangely prone to delude itself that it is the wisdom from above), doubtless make it possible to achieve a catholicity such as will embrace those who find it difficult to pay the necessary price of a personal insight, a personal belief, a personal ethic. Doubtless, likewise, it may be claimed with a measure of reasonability that an objective embodiment in institution and an objective *depositum* in historical happening and in dogmatic statement is a pedagogic necessity for the many. Nevertheless the discussion is not here about the utilities, but about the truth. And in the light of this primary requirement it must—must it not?—be acknowledged that no past event can be regarded as *de fide*, but only as *de ratione*. What purports to be history can only be asserted to be such by those who have critically enquired. And inasmuch as this type of enquiry is impossible to all but a few in each successive generation, to regard interior assent to historical fact as of the essence of Christianity is to make Christianity possible only to a few in each generation.

Curiously enough, this plea for the non-essentiality of a personal assent to the historicity of narrated events is welcomed both by the simple-minded and by the subtle-minded Christian. To the former, historical enquiry is a closed book; he therefore feels himself unable to pass judgment on questions of debated or debateable historicity. To the latter, historical enquiry is indispensable to his mental and moral integrity; yet the more devotedly he pursues these enquiries the less is he likely to claim that they involve his personal Christian faith and life. His spiritual insights and mystical awarenesses are not dependent

on his judgment with regard to specific questions of history. Acknowledgment of historical mediation is not the same as belief in the happenings from which, according to narrative and tradition, flowed that mediatorial stream. The distinction which Kant in 1792 suggested to Fichte in order to assist him to bring his *Kritik aller Offenbarung* into harmony with the fundamentalist ideas of the Dean of the Theological Faculty at Halle is a distinction whose validity a personal Christian faith, whether learned or unlearned, whether simple or subtle, always recognizes. You have to try to make your censor, advised Kant, 'comprehend and approve the distinction between a *dogmatic belief* raised above all doubt and a mere moral admission resting on the insufficiency of reason to satisfy its own wants.' Kant, however, had too clear a perception of the realities of the apologetic situation in his day to hold out much hope to the young Fichte that this distinction would prove acceptable to a censor who, as he said, 'makes historical belief an unconditional religious duty.' After 135 years it is to be feared that the traditionalist mind is no nearer to recognizing, much less to approving, a distinction which is of the essence of 'the religion of the spirit' in every age.

Let us, however, hasten to the consideration of the second position, that, namely, which asserts the essentiality of historical happenings to Christianity, or that, as it has often been stated, 'Christianity is essentially a historical religion.' What does this assertion mean? It is, I think, obvious that it means more than the commonplace fact that Christianity has had a history; every other religion in the world has had a history. Nor can it mean that Christianity came full-grown into this world at a certain point of time in the past, and has been handed down unchanged to the present. In spite of certain *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus* claims, there is no assertion which history more easily disproves. There is a measure of truth in what Anatole France declared: 'Religions, like chameleons, copy the colours of the soil over which they run'; and few historians are likely to dispute the assertion that in most parts of Christendom the gods, the beliefs, the morals of heathen ancestors are still being served, accepted, followed. Does the position under present consideration mean, then, that with respect to the place occupied

by historical assertions in the Creeds, Christianity is unique among the religions? This, however, is a mere historical commonplace which the Hindoo, the Buddhist, the Muhammedan will acknowledge as readily as the Christian. I therefore conclude the assertion means more than that. Does it, then, mean that belief in the several historical statements enshrined in the Creeds is essential to Christianity? That meaning can hardly be implied, inasmuch as many of those who maintain the position do not accept all these historical assertions. Von Hügel, for example, in answer to a correspondent who seemingly could not accept the historicity of 'the Virgin Birth, the Bodily Resurrection, the Johannine Miracles,' replied that it was still possible to 'retain the more general and the bed-rock principle of the Catholic mind.' The position *does* mean, I think, or, rather, the kernel of truth in this position is, as it seems to me, that what is called 'the Historic Incarnation' is of the essence of the *message* which Christians believe and declare to the world.

The distinguishing Christian message, throughout Christian history, has been that 'God was in Christ,' that is, that He was uniquely incarnate in a certain historic figure, known as Jesus the Christ. On the bizarre theory of the non-historicity of Jesus, which has recently attracted some attention, the message of such a historic Incarnation is an untrue message, to speak with desirable directness at this point. On this theory the central message of Christianity is an idea which has been objectified and 'concretized' in a Jesus imaginatively, mythically or 'spiritually' (to use M. Couchoud's astonishing word in this connection) created. I am not, however, here concerned with the specific historical question at issue, nor with a theory of Christian origins which presupposes so unique and universal an aberration.[6] I am only concerned, now, with the elucidation of the position under consideration, namely, that Christianity is the religion of a 'historic Incarnation.' And I am pointing out that Christianity, so conceived, presupposes, and rests upon, historical fact.

Nevertheless, it must be further pointed out that inasmuch as the question is not, What has been the Christian message and

[6] See *The Modern Churchman* for April and May, 1927; Article on 'The Problem of Jesus.'

belief? but, Is that message and belief true? an unavoidable historical, as well as metaphysical, issue remains. That issue, I say, cannot be sundered from historical enquiry, for we must seek to ascertain who was the historic Jesus, what did He think, what did He say, what did He do? The quest of the historic Jesus is a quest imposed upon all who make or maintain a historical assertion. When we remember how frequently Jesus has been 'the personification of a metaphysical idea' we shall the more clearly perceive the necessity of such an investigation. It is, then, no proof of the truth of the Christian message of a historic Incarnation that such a belief has been continuous in Christian history and has survived to the present day. The fact of survival must, indeed, be one of the factors assisting us to a historical conclusion, but it does not in and by itself warrant the truth of that assertion. In strict judicial impartiality this requires to be stated, inasmuch as the argument has so frequently been either directly employed or indirectly assumed that survival proves truth.[7] Survival so often proves mental, moral and spiritual sloth; so often, also, the tenacity with which institutions defend themselves against truth. One searches in vain to discover in history either an age which has hearkened to its prophets or an institution which has loved truth as much as itself. What here, however, I wish to emphasize is that on the open ground where historical issues are impartially decided there are to be found for refuge or security no trenches conveniently prepared by infallibility or survival presuppositions.

The main issue, however, remains. If once we declare our allegiance to the essential Christian message of a historic Incarnation, it is idle to declare that the truth of Christianity is independent of History. It is not then permissible to retreat upon a personal conviction of the love of God, or upon a sense

[7] I may perhaps be permitted to give one recent illustration of this fallacious contention. Speaking of the Church of the first three centuries, a recent writer has said: 'The orthodox Church proved the truth of its teaching by its survival: the falsehood of rival forms of teaching was proved by their disappearance' (*Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 107). No historian, no philosopher, and certainly no psychologist could pass such an assertion unchallenged, at least in the form in which it is stated, however sincerely he might give assent to the specific teaching to which reference is made. If we take very long views we may, on the basis of our religious faith, believe that survival proves truth—*magna est veritas et praevalebit*. But everywhere we see the, at least temporary, survival of ideas palpably false.

of filial relationship to God. I do not, of course, question the validity of this conviction or of this experience. But I *do* say that the apologetic issue has been thus evaded instead of faced. We may not even escape the historical problem, presented by the proclamation of a historic Incarnation, by insisting that the essence of Christianity is a personal experience of the living Christ.

The apologetic claim, therefore, that the historic Jesus was a unique Incarnation of God requires this insistence on the right and duty of historical enquiry. There are some, both of the left and of the right, who would evade this enquiry. The mythologists, both of the rationalist and of the mystical type, do so. Likewise the traditionalists, whether of the orthodox Roman (represented, for example, by *Lamentabili*) or of the fundamentalist Protestant, do so. With his many and mutually antagonistic opponents, the liberal evangelical or modernist thinker may occasionally find himself a little bewildered. Let him not thus be deterred from straight thinking, and from fidelity both to History and to Christian truth.

The Christian apologist cannot shut himself up within his personal experiences and insights and let the great and acute issues raised by the relation of Christianity and History go by. He cannot flee to the haven of mystical peace, forgetful of the many precious ships at present on the tempestuous seas of historical enquiry. He cannot evade, or hedge from, historical issues which are there, which are *given*, for he has sufficient insight into the weaknesses to which the human mind is prone to know that this would be the certain sign of the doubt which like a cancer has begun to eat away the vitals of a true and living faith.

If this were a critical investigation of the specific issues raised by the Gospel narratives, it would be necessary for me to confront the perplexities raised by the following two considerations: first, the fragmentary or inadequate nature of the data from which, in frequent instances, conclusions have to be derived; and, second, the inevitable subjectivities from which, in the present stage of humanity's evolution, no historian can escape. Doubtless these points, and the other specific historical problems confronting the student of Christian origins, will receive attention at the forthcoming Conference of Modern

Churchmen. I give the following recent quotation from Dr. Maurice Goguel to indicate the position generally arrived at with regard to the Gospel problems, the position from which he assails the mythologists:

> 'On sait . . . que la critique a établi—c'est un point sur lequel il n'y a plus à revenir—que les quatres évangiles et même les trois synoptiques ne forment pas un bloc homogène dont toutes les parties seraient sur le même plan. Du moins, parmi ceux qui admettent que les évangiles peuvent et doivent être l'objet d'études historiques et critiques au même titre que n'importe quel autre document historique, personne ne conteste plus que la littérature évangélique telle que nous la possédons ne soit le résultat d'un développement littéraire assez complexe et assez long dans lequel on peut reconnaître des couches successives qui, pour l'essentiel au moins, se distinguent assez nettement les unes des autres et dans les plus récentes desquelles on reconnaît facilement l'influence des conceptions, des préoccupations et des sentiments de la seconde ou de la troisième génération chrétienne, c'est-à-dire de croyants qui, ne serait-ce que parce que la plupart d'entre eux étaient des païens convertis, présentaient une physionomie intellectuelle et morale très différente de celle des premiers disciples palestiniens de Jesus.'[8]

This position, needless to say, is like a sword with two edges, one of which cuts into the obscurantist 'all or nothing' position and the other into the mythologist's 'nothing at all' position. It affords no satisfaction to those who cannot believe that the Gospel stream had no unhistorical tributaries, nor to those who seemingly cannot see that the Christian stream first flowed from a unique historic personality.

What conclusions can be drawn from the several considerations which we have endeavoured to elucidate in the course of this discussion?

I. My first conclusion is that *Christianity's apologetic issue, while deeper than the historical issue, cannot be sundered from it.* Apologetic seeks to establish to a perplexed and hesitant generation the truth of that central and essential affirmation of a unique historic Incarnation. That very affirmation — that 'God's word for this world is Christ'—involves that to historical science is given the task of ascertaining the historical substantiation of this claim.

This word 'substantiation' is, however, hardly the correct word to use in this connection. For History—that is, event in time—cannot prove an 'Incarnation.' We cannot logically or historically demonstrate that 'God was in Christ'; no scientific

[8] *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses,* Sept.-Oct., 1927, p. 469.

or historical fact necessitates or involves the metaphysical conclusion which the term Incarnation presupposes. It was on the forgetfulness of this surely most obvious truth that there was erected that astonishing edifice of nineteenth century 'Evidences' apologetic. And so 'miracles' evidenced the Incarnation! The edifice has now fallen, in spite of various endeavours, some quite recent, to support its tottering walls. And all that is now left to be done is to pick up the sound stones and therewith to erect an edifice on foundations that are sure. But to return from this slight digression; the endeavour to prove or substantiate the Incarnation by scientific or historical investigation is, and must ever be, futile. Even if the fundamentalist position were conceded, that every 'miracle' of the Gospels happened as reported, we should be not one step nearer to the metaphysical conclusion maintained. I will go even further, and say that even if the sinlessness of Jesus were proved to a historical demonstration (which in the nature of the case is impossible) we should not have *proved* an Incarnation. I cannot conceive that the presence of even an absolutely sinless person in the world to-day would convince a materialist of the error of his philosophy. The apologetic issue, therefore, goes much deeper than the historical issue. It is for this reason that the phrase 'historic Incarnation,' while necessary to set forth the claim of Christianity, may easily mislead both the historian and the apologist, because it may lead both to imagine that historical investigation can give the final word about the truth of this claim.

Nevertheless, the Incarnational affirmation of Christianity cannot be sundered from the historical issue. Our conception of Incarnation must, in other words, be true to the historical facts. We must beware of historicizing our metaphysical concepts; we must be on our guard against the customary traditionalist fallacy, deducing *a priori*, that is, what a manifestation of God in human flesh *must* be. Here we must reason *a posteriori*, that is, from history. We must, like Huxley, be docile to the facts, sit down quietly before them and see whither they lead. Without any manner of doubt, it is this unhesitating fidelity to 'the irreducible and stubborn facts' which constitutes the mentality of our truth-loving generation. And the apologist who has not this mental outlook can have no message for this age.

II. My second conclusion is that *the religion of a Christian cannot be sundered from History*. I will state, first, what by this assertion I do *not* mean.

By this I do not mean that one who has interior acquaintance with the ethical and the spiritual insight which characterizes the essentially Christian life must assent to the historicity of narrated happenings, not even, let me add, to the historicity of Jesus: for, as we have pointed out, such an assent can only have interior meaning to us if it is begotten of historical enquiry.

Nor do I mean that such a one is called upon to commit to the charge of any institutional embodiment of Christianity — whether to the Roman Church, which by its very nature claims such a surrender, or to any other Church — the authoritarian decision as to precisely what or which narrated Gospel events are either historical or essential to Christian belief. For with such a surrender personal religion has nothing to do.

Nor do I mean that such a one is called to assent to the familiar dichotomy of history into natural and supernatural, the second being subject, the first not being subject, to a non-natural or 'supernatural' Inspiration or Direction. With the 'conventional crude Supernaturalism,' as Professor Hermann Gunkel has recently called it, personal religion and ethical insight not only have nothing to do, but to it are, as I hold, definitely antipathetic. For the disintegration of that old scheme of history many causes are responsible, among them the comparative study of religions and that remarkable advance in scientific historical enquiry which the nineteenth century witnessed. Not least, however, among such causes is the keener, less hesitating, and peremptory ethical insight which no longer consented to submit to a scheme that left all but a small section of humanity either to a Calvinistic 'uncovenanted' mercy or to a non-providential direction.

Nor do I mean that what used to be called one's 'eternal salvation' is dependent either upon any event in history as such, or upon one's own belief in such event. For it is not possible to admit that one's 'salvation' can be sundered from one's personal religious ethic and insight. Here it must, I think, be confessed that a forensic and transactional soteriology has been responsible for many, if not most, of the apologetic difficulties

which have confronted Christianity, defended as *the* historical religion. If once Christianity is conceived in terms of a historically-transacted soteriology requiring an intellectual assent, then the old deistic objection that Christianity excludes the majority of mankind from the possibility of this 'salvation' is unanswerable. It cannot be denied that the religion we embrace, or which embraces us, is decided by considerations over many of which we have no control—our varied cultural environments and the 'congenital diversity' of our minds. Rousseau, in the person of the *vicaire Savoyard*, put the matter in this characteristically eighteenth century way. Speaking of the several religions, he said :

> 'S'il en est une qu'il [God] prescrive aux hommes, et qu'il les punisse de meconnaître, il lui a donné des signes certains et manifestes pour être distinguée et connue pour la seule véritable : ces signes sont de tous les temps et de tous les lieux, également sensibles à tous les hommes, grands et petits, savants et ignorants, Européens, Indiens, Africains, sauvages. S'il était une religion sur la terre hors de laquelle il n'y eût que peine éternelle, et qu'en quelque lieu du monde un seul mortel de bonne foi n'eût pas été frappé de son évidence, le Dieu de cette religion serait le plus inique et le plus cruel des tyrans.'

By this assertion I *do* mean that our personal Christian insight, belief, ethic *are mediated to us by history*. If, for example, with any personal or interior assent I can pray to God as Father, or can declare that 'all things work together for good,' it is because history has mediated to me truths which not only have commended themselves to my own insight, but have, through the continuity for which history stands, inspired it, or made it possible. This is the essential truth for which Church, and Tradition, stand, the Church and the Tradition which we see not yet manifest on the earth in institutional and dogmatic form. To claim a personal sufficiency for one's own religious faith and experience is, surely, the negation of the truly religious spirit. Such a spirit is ever humbly grateful to the past, with an enlightened gratitude which is never an uncritical submission, much less a defiant self-sufficiency. And such a spirit will ever acknowledge : Not unto me, O Lord, not unto me be the glory for my own faith, my own conviction, my own insight, my own ideal, but unto Thee, O Lord, and to Him to Whom, through Thee, these insights first supremely came, and unto the innumerable company of those who have mediated the same to me.

KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGY

By the Rev. G. L. H. Harvey, M.A., Vicar of Earley.

KARL Barth was born in 1886 at Basle. He matriculated at Berne in 1904 as a student of theology, and later studied at the Universities of Berlin, Tübigen, and Marburg. During his student days he came under the influence of Harnack and Herrmann, and it was as a professed disciple of Herrmann that in 1909 he took up pastoral work in Geneva. While at Geneva he became profoundly dissatisfied with his theology. It seemed to him to be ineffective for practical pastoral purposes. He therefore set about thinking his position out from first principles. The result was his monumental *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, the first edition of which was published in 1918. In 1921 he was appointed Professor of Reformed Theology in Göttingen, and in 1924 appeared his commentary on I *Corinthians* entitled *The Resurrection of the Dead*. In the same year he published a collection of papers of various dates from 1916 to 1923 under the title *The Word of God and Theology*. A school of theological thought crystallized round him, its most prominent members being F. Gogarten and E. Thurneysen, and since 1922 this group has published a theological journal, *Between the Ages*, which now appears bi-monthly.

It was as 'the man in the pulpit,' Barth tells us, that he elaborated his theology or, as he would prefer to call it, his criticism of theology. He felt that the only true objective of a pastor was to reveal God to his flock, and he was profoundly conscious that his previous theological training had not fitted him for a task so tremendous. It was not enough to strive to help his hearers to live a good life. Within the temporal sphere they were as competent as he was. He likens earthly existence to an algebraical expression within brackets. Outside the brackets is a minus sign or question-mark, 'a great What? Why? Whither? Whence?' This question-mark is the *raison d'etre* of the Christian minister, who ought to be concerned exclusively with the sign outside the brackets, 'this question of all ques-

tions to which men know they have no answer.' The tension of his feeling finds vent in words which he wrote in 1922:

> 'We ought as theologians to speak of God. We are but men, and as such cannot speak of God. We are bound to recognize both aspects of the position, our duty and our inability, and so doing to give God the glory. In these straits we find ourselves. All else is child's play.'

In the simile of the brackets Barth reveals the radical dualism which underlies all his thought. The earthly life of man is enclosed in impenetrable brackets, and God is entirely outside these brackets. Seeing then that the phenomena, with which history and psychology deal, lie within the brackets, a theology which uses historical or psychological methods is so far incompetent to provide an answer to the question-mark outside. On this view it is also clear that religion must needs be alien from science, art, and general culture. Barth is quite ready, as he says in the Introduction to *The Resurrection of the Dead*, to use the results of historical criticism, and he fully acknowledges his debt to modern New Testament scholarship; but in principle his absolute dualism stands as an unbridgable gulf between the Barthian theology and any theology which is, however mildly, liberal or humanistic. It is very significant that while he claims kinship with 'Kierkegaard, Luther, Calvin, Paul, and Jeremiah,' he emphatically dissociates himself from 'Schleiermacher, Melancthon, and Erasmus.' He detests the Aufklärung and despises what he calls the 'frivolous piety' of Kultur-Protestantism.

His dualism is based on a profound pessimism. He looks out on the world and sees 'the suffering of men, the guilt of men, the doom of men' manifested in 'the frenzy of our cities, the dull stupidity of our villages . . . the terrors of birth and death, the riddle of nature . . . the futility of the cycles of world-history.' He perceives in things as they are no justification for the 'fraudulent supposition' of an overruling providence or an ultimate harmony. 'All the arguments in favour of a direct justification of the things of this world were long ago advanced in the speeches of Job's comforters and were refuted.' It is futile to seek for God in such a world. God is the *deus absconditus*. 'God! We know not what we say when we use this word. He who believes knows that we do not know.'

Barth quite decisively rejects the possibility of divine revelation through human personality or the events of human history. Revelation can come to this world only from outside and above. It is essentially miraculous.

> 'We are all quite familiar,' he writes, 'with the feeling of unsettlement we experience when, looking through the window, we see the people outside suddenly come to a stop, turn their faces skyward, shade their eyes with their hands and gaze fixedly upwards at something which is hidden from our vision by the roof above us. We need not really trouble ourselves; no doubt they are only staring at a passing aeroplane. But when we see the men of the Bible come to a sudden halt, gaze heavenward and listen to something with strained attention, reassurance is not so easy. I personally first received this impression from Paul—that of a man who sees and hears clearly something which is unique, something which is beyond my power to see, something which transcends my thought.'

By the side of Paul he places John, Matthew, and Luke, while behind these stand 'figures without name, unknown to history, in Jerusalem, and further back on the shores of the Sea of Galilee,' and again, behind all, the seers of the Old Testament. These figures are but 'eyes and ears' for an external revelation. They 'mock at all historical causality,' for revelation is a 'vertical miracle,' a breaking-through of something from outside the sphere of human life. The men of the Bible are but passive instruments of supernatural revelation. That is why the Bible shows so little interest in the biographies of its heroes. That is why 'to the acute distress of our contemporary theologians' it contains no Life of Jesus. 'Of more than one of these men of God, to speak frankly, we form the impression that they must personally have been quite intolerable owls.'

Though God is a *deus absconditus*, though, to use a simile to which Barth repeatedly has recourse, the divine world is to the world of experience as a vertical to a horizontal plane, man still feels the need of God and is tragically conscious of the question-mark which stands outside the brackets in which his life is enclosed. Whence comes the possibility, as Barth puts it, that man should know himself to be 'but man,' that he should think of time as 'only time,' that things should be to him 'merely things'? He replies on purely negative grounds. Man is ill-content with life as it is because he is a fallen being.

> 'Originally (*ursprünglich*) man lives in Paradise, where there is no 'over' and 'under,' no 'absolute' and 'relative,' no 'temporal'

> and 'eternal' . . . where the cosmos is at one with creation, man with God, where the natural as such is holy because all that is holy is natural . . .'

Yet Barth rejects any conception of the Fall as either a historical or a psychological event. The 'rending of the spiritual bond which unites God to world and man' is 'the timeless transcendent condition of the human world.' 'With the first man who found himself in this world, and with the world in which the first man found himself this condition was manifest.' The created world is a phenomenal world, and therefore the Fall was implicit in the divine act of creation, for it is inherent in a phenomenal world that there is a separation, a distinction, between it and God. It is in this separation that the Fall consists. Hence Calvinism is justified in teaching that man is predestined to reprobation. Nor does Barth shrink from the dreadful though, on his premises, the inevitable conclusion that 'sin is an inconceivable negative happening to God and in God' ('an Gott und in Gott').

Man being an utterly fallen being, it is vain to look for any positive intimation of God in man as he is. There is no divine spark within the human soul. Max Strauch, one of Barth's most ardent admirers, in his book on Barth's theology thus sums up his position. 'The premise from which ethics and dogmatics alike proceed is the radical insoluble dualism betwixt God and the world. From this premise follows a devaluation of all values, goods and ends of this world, including that which is loftiest in culture, ethics, and religion. All this, quite as much as that which is lowest in life, shares in the interim character, the sinful character of all that is human.' In this connection Barth points out that on occasion the Bible 'shows a striking indifference to our conceptions of good and evil. Abraham who, as the highest proof of his faith, is willing to offer up his son; Jacob who secures the right of the first-born through a cunning trick played on his father; Elijah who slaughters the 450 priests of Baal by the Brook of Kishon—these are not exactly admirable models.' It is this depreciation of human worth which leads him to rejoice that the bearers of the revelation of God were in some cases intolerable owls, and to say of S. Paul that 'an impressive Apostle would as such be no Apostle. A humanly persuasive testimony would as such be no Christian testimony.'

Barth's harsh insistence on the absolute transcendence of God, his radical pessimism, his blank refusal to make any terms whatever with immanental theology raise the question of the possibility of any relationship between two planes so disparate as the divine and the human. In face of this difficulty he attempts to bridge the unbridgable by an endless succession of bewildering paradoxes aptly described by Martin Werner as 'a brain-benumbing drum-fire.' 'Out of the inconceivable reserves of his rhetoric he hurls troop after troop of affirmations and counter-affirmations.' This he calls the dialectical method. He speaks of a position between affirmation and counter-affirmation, which he likens to a narrow ridge.

> 'Along this narrow rocky ridge we must constantly move forward; for if we halt we shall fall down either to the right or to the left, but in either case we shall assuredly fall downwards. So it only remains for us—a dismal prospect for all who are not proof against dizziness—to embrace both positive and negative together though opposed one to the other, never remaining for more than one moment in a rigid Yea or Nay.'

This method, as Barth describes it, and as he uses it, seems far remote from the dialectic of logic. He expresses his astonishment 'that there are still theologians who go to the Catholic Church and who knows where else, to acquire knowledge of the so-called numinous.' Truly it would seem that, if they are sufficiently proof against dizziness, they ought to be able to find as much numinosity as they can desire on the narrow ridge of Barthian dialectical rhetoric.

Jesus Christ is the Supreme Paradox. Schleiermacher and his successors have found in the Jesus of history the ground and inspiration of the Christian faith. Barth refuses to approach the Christological problem from the historical side. He will have nothing to do with Christ after the flesh. He denies that even 'in the oldest, best attested, most trustworthy tradition does the Kurios speak for' S. Paul. S. Paul's Christ was the divine figure which revealed itself to him on the road to Damascus. The historic Jesus was the Jesus of Nazareth whom Paul persecuted. So Barth will not start from our knowledge of Jesus, the Christ after the flesh. That would be to take his stand on the plane of history. The starting-point according to him must be the supernatural external revelation of the Resurrection. In the name

Jesus Christ our Lord 'two planes meet and intersect, a known plane and an unknown plane . . . The known plane is the world created by God but fallen from its original unity with God, a world therefore of the flesh athirst for salvation, the world of man and time and things, our world. This known plane is cut by another and an unknown plane, the world of the Father, the world of original creation and of final redemption. The line of intersection between the two is not of itself perceptible. The point of the line of intersection where it is to be seen, where it becomes visible, is Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth, the "historic Jesus," born of the house of David after the flesh. Jesus, conceived historically, signifies the place of rupture (*Bruchstelle*) between the world known to us and an unknown world.' He is revealed as the Lord through and only through the Resurrection. Apart from the Resurrection he is the great Incognito. Here consistency demands that Barth should somehow remove the Resurrection from the plane of time and history, and he accordingly insists that the Resurrection is a supra-temporal happening. It is to be understood neither 'as miracle, nor myth, nor psychical experience.' It is no subject for historical investigation nor is there any 'direct immediate continuity between the "historic" facts of the Resurrection narratives (as *e.g.* the empty grave of the Synoptic Gospels or the appearances of I *Cor.* 15) and the Resurrection itself.' It is an eschatological fact, and Barth's eschatology is not set within a temporal framework. It is concerned with final things, but they are not final in the sense that they are the last things in a time series. Barth will not listen to any argument based on 'the personality of Jesus, or the Sermon on the Mount, or the healing of the sick, or the trust of Jesus in God, or His brotherly love, or His call to repentance, or His message of forgiveness or His fight against traditionalism in religion, or . . . ' 'Nothing of all this shines of its own light.' Barth's radical dualism demands that the light should shine exclusively from the vertical plane. In his anxiety to keep the two planes separate he even changes his geometrical imagery, for after all two planes must needs have a line of intersection, even if it be invisible to mortal eyes. So, when dealing with the Resurrection, he abandons the simile of the intersecting planes for that of a tangent and a circle. 'In the

Resurrection,' he says, 'the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh. But it touches it as the tangent touches the circle without touching it; and just because it does not touch it, it touches it as its limit, the new world.' Apparently he means that as no measurable portion of a tangent coincides with any measurable portion of the circumference of a circle, so no portion of the new world, the world of God, coincides with any portion of this world, the world of flesh. The abstract character of Barth's geometric Christology proceeds from a stubborn refusal to admit the possibility that the divine may become immanent within the brackets which enclose the world of history. Of Jesus the last word which can be said on historical grounds is that He was buried. 'This fact is as equivocal as all earthly facts. The Gospels do not attempt to conceal that the perception of the empty grave and the perception of the Risen One differed *toto coelo*.' The Resurrection is to be conceived 'neither as outward nor inward, neither subjectively nor objectively, neither mystically nor as a spiritualistic phenomenon nor as flatly historical. It is within the sphere of God's activity and, as such, may only be comprehended within the category of Revelation and in no way otherwise.' At all costs the category of external revelation must be preserved intact, even at the cost of conceiving the historic Jesus as a *Bruchstelle*! Like the Fall, the Resurrection belongs to a timeless transcendent sphere, and to the same sphere belongs the Parousia. Hence the Parousia, being outside time, is not to be conceived as something separated in time from the Resurrection. 'The Parousia of Christ is not something different from the Resurrection, a second event standing near it.' Nor is it to be thought of as 'a gross, brutal, theatrical' event. Indeed Barth seems at times to reduce the whole of eschatology to metaphysics.

The movement of which Karl Barth is the inspiration is primarily a religious and only secondarily a theological movement. Its period of gestation covered the years of the World War and the succeeding years of disillusionment when indeed to many God seemed to be a *deus absconditus*. Barth, as a man engaged in pastoral work, was faced with the familiar question, 'Where may we find God amidst this irrational seething chaos?' To this question he gave and still gives the frank reply, 'I en-

tirely agree with you that God is not to be found on this earthly plane.' His theology has been called a Desperado Theology. It is a not unfair description, but in the despair there is something noble—a passionate affirmation of God though God be absent from this world of change and decay. In Barth's paradoxical rhetoric there is a real religious passion, and though one may not be able to assent to his system of thought, it is difficult not to agree to some extent with Professor Haitjema's impression that 'one cannot but hear the hammer of the word of God beating on the door of our heart in this crashing mighty avalanche of thought.' Perhaps, like Nietzsche, whom he is fond of quoting, he is more profitably to be regarded as a rhapsodist than as a systematic thinker. Much that is characteristic of Barth may be found in the two following quotations from among his many quotations from Nietzsche. 'The old thinkers,' writes Nietzsche, 'strove with all their might after happiness and truth; but the fact that never shall man find that after which he needs must strive, proclaims the evil principle which underlies Nature. Yet whoever faces the falsehood which resides in all things, and of his own will allies himself to misery . . . for him earth's burden vanishes, its power and its happenings fade into a dream, and around him spreads a glory like the glow of a summer evening . . . ' And again, 'Normally we do not emerge out of animalhood; we ourselves are the beasts who seem to suffer irrationally. But there are moments when we grasp this, and then the clouds are rent asunder, and we perceive that together with the whole of Nature we are pressing onward towards Manhood as towards something which stands high above us . . . ' Barth will not allow that man is pressing forward towards true manhood, for to him there is no way from man to God. Thought itself lies under the curse which broods over all things. 'Man is known of God. *Cogitor, ergo sum.* In this *cogitor* God is true, and all men with their "cogitare" are liars.' The clouds for Barth are only rent by a purely external revelation. But still in these two passages of Nietzsche we find the two fundamental ideas of Barth—that Nature is evil and man wretched, and that a revelation, a redemption may come from above.

Another modern who is very congenial to Barth's thought is Dostoiewski, the man in whom Oswald Spengler sees the em-

bodiment of the Christianity of the next thousand years. Barth himself places him in most distinguished company—'Abraham, Jeremiah, Socrates, Grünewald, Luther, Kierkegaard, Dostoiewski.' In him he finds 'the hunger after eternity.' To him he appeals for support of his contention that in religion there 'is no room for noble sentiments and exalted humanitarianism.' 'Let innocent mid-Europeans and Westerners think this so long as they can. Here is the abyss; here is horror; here demons appear (Ivan Karamasoff and Luther!).' The eagerness with which Barth turns his back on Western thought, holding out both hands towards a semi-Oriental pessimism is very significant.

Barth's thought is essentially Calvinistic, and is therefore not in principle antagonistic to scientific determinism. There is no conflict between science and religion as Barth conceives it, for the two move on different planes. There is therefore no need for reconciliation. The scientist does not claim to move elsewhere than on the horizontal plane. Barth can allow the historian also to pursue his task undisturbed on the same plane. He only objects when the theologian, who, in his view, ought to be concerned with an entirely different plane, begins to use methods appropriate to the historian or scientist. He cares nothing whether or not 'such figures as Abraham and Moses be mythical creations of a later age.' What does matter to him is that 'a couple of centuries sooner or later, there were men who believed as Abraham believed, who, like Isaac and Jacob, were strangers in the promised land, plainly seeking a fatherland, looking, as Moses looked, on the things they saw not as though they saw them.' But the cessation of friction between religion and the world of culture is bought at a disastrous price, the abandonment of the claim of Religion on the whole world of human thought and aspiration. In spite of Barth, man will still continue to conjugate the verb *cogitare* in the Active Voice.

BOOK REVIEWS

PEDLAR, PILGRIM, PREACHER*

Two books about John Bunyan lie open before us. They reflect divergent points of view. They have been produced by the thought that this year the tercentenary of so great a man as Bunyan must needs be celebrated. How far both the Dean of Winchester and Mr. Coats fail in their endeavours to estimate the importance and influence of this 'tinker out of Bedford' may be gauged when they are compared with the best short study on this subject. We refer to the book on Bunyan which J. A. Froude wrote in the early eighties. We have been wondering why the latest writers should have fallen so far short of the excellence of the great Victorian. Some reasons are obvious enough.

Froude had gifts and graces of an exceptional kind. His ability, like some great actor, to put himself into the past and forget himself, is not given to all historians. Froude's success as an imaginative historian was so startling that he was charged by his contemporaries with being no historian at all. Time is serving out better justice to him.

Another obvious reason for Froude's superiority probably lies in the fact that he set out on his exploration of Bunyan as an adventure with nothing so practical as a tercentenary in view. Here we think the Dean fails. He is not really in sympathy with the hero. Mr. Coats certainly betrays hero-worship, though it is far below the level reached and maintained by his great predecessor. It is less catholic, less penetrating, and not so subtle. It may be that Froude's inimitable style has spoilt us. But there is another reason for this difference of treatment and effect. Both the Dean and Mr. Coats are in a milieu radically different from that in which Froude lived and thought. Psychology and Pragmatism had not then created the confusion in which we are all enveloped to-day. Varieties of religious experience have become such an obsession with us, that it is necessary to go back to the Mediterranean civilisation of the time of the Apostles to find its parallel. As cocktails and caviare have degraded the modern palate, so mystical cults, antique and modern, genuine and faked, are corrupting the Christian Conscience of our time. Hence our sympathy with the 'mystical' experiences of erotic devotees whose light is the darkness made apparent by the glow of the sanctuary lamp.

John Bunyan was a Puritan Protestant, and both Puritanism and Protestantism are at a discount to-day, and that because rationality and morality are showing a tendency to become divorced from Christianity. Yet it is not far-fetched to compare John Bunyan and Francis of Assisi. What Francis is in Catholicism, Bunyan is in Puritanism. Each had a sense of humour and felt that it had its place in the Christian religion. One of Bunyan's contemporaries wrote: 'Some there be that say he laughs too much.' Both were truly twice-born men: they knew the difference in themselves between the natural man and the spiritual man. Both were utterly regardless of that 'yellow demon-fear' of our time—financial security. Bunyan refused an advantageous offer from a rich London merchant admirer to help his son on in life. To him Bunyan replied: 'God did not send me to advance any family, but to preach the Gospel.' Francis, we know, preached to the birds 'when Love set his heart on fire.' John wrote in *Grace Abounding*: 'I thought I could have spoken of his Love,

**John Bunyan.* By R. H. Coats, M.A. (S.C.M. 4/- net.; 2/6 paper cover. 128 pp.)
John Bunyan. By Rev. W. H. Hutton, D.D., Dean of Winchester. (Hodder and Stoughton: Peoples' Library. 2/6. 282 pp.)

and told of his mercy to me, even to the very crows that sat upon the plowed lands before me, had they been capable to have understood me.' Both were joyous Christians. John's joyousness comes out vividly in the splendid sentence telling of the joy of Christiana and her boys: 'One smiled and another smiled, and they all smiled for joy.' Both embodied the spirit of the theology of their time, and both made the dry bones of their traditional dogmas to live. Both, after their conversion, were indifferent to contemporary politics and thereby exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the future. Both gladly suffered for their religious convictions. Both approached the same city from different points of the ecclesiastical compass—and both entered that city through the gates that are all of pearl—the symbol of suffering.

There may be varieties of religious experience, using that term in the widest sense, but of the genuine Christian experience there is only one kind. There will be differences of expression due to the particular circumstances in each case. The root is the same, it is buried deep in the soil of Galilee. The branches of this vine produce grapes and nothing else. Vintages vary.

We have spoken somewhat strongly of the failure of the two modern books on Bunyan. Failure was perhaps inevitable, but it has its use. Both books are worth reading if they lead us to Froude and from Froude to the works of Bunyan. They are true stories of what God did with an Englishman.

'A tinker out of Bedford,
A vagrant oft in quod,
A private under Fairfax,
A minister of God.

A pedlar from a hovel,
The lowest of the low,
The Father of the Novel,
Salvation's first Defoe.'

Bunyan and his like are the pioneers who find what 'is hidden behind the ranges.' Whatever clothes they wear, whatever tongue be theirs, they possess two characteristics in common. First the determination to 'find the stone that turneth all to gold,' and secondly the courage to proclaim their treasure-trove. Let Bunyan speak for all his class:

'Who would true Valour see,
Let him come hither;
One here will constant be
Come Wind, come Weather.' A.T.W.D.

CIVILIZATION RE-MADE BY CHRIST.*

Readers of Mr. Spencer's previous book, *The Ethics of the Gospel*, will turn eagerly to this, which is in some sense a sequel to it; but in any case the present volume should be widely read. We have had very many books since the publication of the C.O.P.E.C. reports covering some part of the field; and several, notably Prof. Urwick's *The Social Good*, which deal with the whole area of sociology. But no book known to us combines so excellently a wide treatment of great themes with concreteness of handling and definite reference to the teaching of Jesus. This is indeed Mr. Spencer's chief contribution that he surveys with candour the vital issues and relates them, not to vague principles, but to specific words and actions of our

**Civilization Re-made by Christ.* By F. A. M. Spencer, B.D. (Allen and Unwin. 1928. 7/6.)

Lord. He will thus help very many who find the usual Christian social treatises somewhat abstract both in their exposition of present conditions and in their references to Christian ideals.

Mr. Spencer has covered a very wide range, and always gives the impression of careful and unprejudiced study, of balanced judgment, and of a high and sane spirituality. It is impossible in the compass of a single volume to aim at completeness: on the economic side the book is hardly adequate, and many will find his treatment of the stewardship of wealth less than satisfying. Similarly, the very difficult problems raised by the pacifist position with regard to war are hardly faced: what is said is wise and tolerant, but does not go deep enough to help the perplexed or to influence the prejudiced.

Yet on other issues, in his examination of modern democracy (or what bears that name), and especially in his very judicious and enlightened chapters on sex, Mr. Spencer succeeds in combining a robust realism with an almost prophetic insight: he faces the facts, sets out the measure of our failures and hopes, and then shows us how the issues can be clarified and our whole outlook upon them ennobled. These are fine examples of what Christian sociology ought to be. Alike in generosity of tone, in clarity of judgment, and in grasp of spiritual values, they are better than anything we have seen.

The worth of the book is due, not so much to the novelty of its conclusions—there is little in it that has not been said before, as to this quality in its author of combining a profound understanding of the teaching of Jesus with a frank recognition of the actual facts of human nature and of modern circumstances. Most of those who have written on the subject lack just this combination. Either they know the present situation, set it out with vigour, and then fail to show how Christ can 're-make' it, or else they are full of Christian fervour, but see the world rather as they wish it to be than as it is. Mr. Spencer has an obvious passion for reality: he believes that Christ can and does regenerate society; but he knows that the task of the Christian needs an enormous patience and an absolute sincerity. His book is entirely free from rhetoric or special pleading; and if at times its conclusions seem a little tame and, to some of us, insufficiently radical, even those who demand a more thorough-going revolution will recognise that here is a singularly honest effort to understand the mind of Christ and to interpret it in its bearing upon actual needs. Such a book should influence many who are quick to resent Victorianism and veiled propaganda.

For ourselves, we specially welcome Mr. Spencer's method of appeal to the teaching and example of Jesus. Too often Christian students have been content to extract from a general reading of the New Testament certain broad principles, the sanctity of personality, the need of fellowship, the call to service, and to use these as the sole and sufficient criteria. Mr. Spencer takes concrete instances from the Gospels and explains their significance, and thus helps us to see that we can get something more than general guidance from our Lord's ministry. Those who believe that the social message of the Master is more concrete than we yet know, and who long to see His life more closely examined in this aspect, will find much encouragement from this book.

The volume is well printed and produced; the foot-notes and quotations are sufficient, but not burdensome; and the style is eminently readable. We note a misprint on p. 186, where in line 11 'impossible' should surely be 'possible.'

C. E. RAVEN.

A FRESH SOLUTION OF AN OLD PROBLEM.*

With his *What can a Man Believe?* Mr. Barton has completed a trilogy of influential little books which will find many readers on both sides of the Atlantic. One expected something good from the author of *The Man Nobody Knows* and *The Book Nobody Knows*. Mr. Barton has exceeded our expectations. *Can a Man Believe?* is not only the best of the three books, but is really the introductory volume of the series. He has kept the good wine until last. In some 180 pages he has packed much that is arresting and typical, which will be welcomed by those who are anxious to know what to believe. Within and without the churches there are many ready to sit at the feet of any teacher who speaks to them with the right voice. Many such voices in this year of grace are lay, and not clerical. Mr. Barton is an American layman. If the significance of this fact is not grasped, why should it be a matter of surprise? Should anything else be expected by those who believe in the Holy Spirit of Truth? This Spirit is not to be cribbed, cabined, or confined within channels of our making. It bloweth where it listeth. In this instance the Spirit, Which spake through the prophets, has possessed the mind and imagination of a successful American business man. A certain ruthlessness, realism, and reaction to success, which are the ruling principles of modern business—the ring where the captains of industry tilt for 'a damsel or two and other delights.'

In this book the Spirit has hold upon the stuff which smashes through to success in Wall Street. It is the full-blooded citizen of the city of commerce, whose gods are success, sport and the society of the 'right-minded.' If such a man takes to religion it will be a full-blooded creed, not contradicting the principles upon which his world-view rests, though it may be complementary to it. Mr. Barton knows his man well, and what he wants, and what he is thinking about. The subject matter of this book is divided into five sections, the titles of which are as sharp as pointed spears, *viz.* 'Should religion be abolished?' The reader in view would probably answer in the affirmative unless something better can be said for religion than is often the case. Mr. Barton thinks that religion suffers more from its friends than from its foes. This is given as the reason for his writing the book at all. In a most interesting preface is a letter from a big business man, who asks Mr. Barton to write an honest book in answer to a straight question 'Can a man believe' to-day? The business man begins by saying that Job is his favourite Biblical character.

> 'Like Job, I shall not be a party to the acceptance and dissemination of *bunk*. I'd rather take his wife's advice and "curse God and die" than add anything to the current over-supply of superstition, fear, and outworn creeds . . . If you will write such a book I will read it. If it meets the question *honestly* I will give it to my son and to the younger men in my business. If it dodges questions, if it tries to *creep up behind my reason through the back door of my emotions*, I will burn it as I would *any other germ-carrier* . . . '

Mr. Barton's book is the answer to this type of mind (dominant everywhere and making good in all countries to-day). Can this mind, so naïve, so vigorous, be baptized with the baptism with which Christ was baptized? Will it drink from the cup of Truth from which He drank? Mr. Barton has done his work, especially the first part, very well. The last part, concerned with what is prospective and constructive, is not of the same calibre. But it is a book to read. Those will like it who have found that life's most important question is not 'What are trumps?' but 'What is Truth?'

A.T.W.D.

**Can a Man Believe?* By Bruce Barton. (Constable. 1928. 3/6.)

CAESAREM APPELLO.

It is a platitude that the times are critical for the Church of England. The National Assembly has given its suffrage, though by reduced majorities, to the revision of the Deposited Book, which has suffered shipwreck in the House of Commons. So far as the ecclesiastical assemblies are concerned therefore, the proposals of the House of Bishops have secured acceptance. But there stands 'the two-handed engine at the door.' How will the whole faithful Commons of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland receive this eirenicon of the Church? If they are moved to pass it, even by a majority of one—and did not Russell's Reform Bill secure a second reading in the Commons by such an exiguous majority?—then may we sing a glad *Te Deum*. But if (*quod Deus avertat*) the Parliament should again reject the Book, what will be the end thereof? Murmurs of disestablishment already fill the air. Will the age-long association of Church and State be rudely broken, and the National Church lose its historic character, emerging as an episcopal sect? Amidst the confusion of tongues there remain a few in Israel who have not bowed the knee to the Baal of 'spiritual autonomy.' Mr. Fawkes, true to tradition, has given us a scintillating defence of the Establishment, and has accumulated reasons for its retention.[1] It is unnecessary to say that his argument sparkles with wise saws and modern instances; but his case deserves more serious examination than a retort courteous in the like witty vein. Although his ideal is the Church of the Eighteenth Century, yet he is well aware that we live in another Georgian age hardly recognisable as the successor of the days of *quieta non movere*.

Perhaps a historical survey will help to elucidate the situation. Before the meeting of the Reformation Parliament of 1529-36 the English clergy occupied a strong position in the kingdom. They met in Convocation to vote their own taxes, and to enact Canons for Provincial observance, and the spiritual peers constituted a majority of the House of Lords. The Tudor monarchy desired to replace the Papal monarchy by the Royal Supremacy. But both Henry VIII and his illustrious daughter Elizabeth intended that supremacy to be royal, not parliamentary. 'The supremacy over the Church was in fact a royal and not a parliamentary supremacy. Elizabeth quarrelled with every one of her parliaments on this question. The sovereign was, in her opinion, supreme over both spheres, ecclesiastical and temporal; but Parliament had only to do with the temporal sphere; Convocation was co-ordinate with, and not subordinate, to it' (Pollard: *Factors in Modern History*, p. 100). The Tudor theory was that if the Convocation, having received the royal licence to prepare Canons, drafted and debated such Canons, and submitted them to the Crown for approval, such Canons, being approved by the sovereign, and not being contrary to the Statute law of the realm, had the force of law without the intermeddling of Parliament. So careful and learned a canonist as Bishop Gibson in the eighteenth century maintained privately the opinion that Canons so made were equally binding upon the laity as upon the clergy, though he did not venture to publish this conclusion in his *Codex* for fear of anti-clerical fury.

The position was altered in the seventeenth century. The Stuart monarchs 'arrogated the same absolutism in the State that they legally possessed in the Church; and the dispensing and suspending powers, which they constitutionally exercised in the ecclesiastical sphere, they extended to the temporal sphere. On the other hand Parliament sought to apply the constitutional limits which bounded the royal authority in the State to the

[1] *Shall we Disestablish?* By the Rev. A. Fawkes. (Blackwell, Oxford. 1928. 2/6.)

royal authority in the Church.' As a result of the victory of the Parliament over the Stuarts, the royal supremacy has become in effect a parliamentary supremacy. The Convocations lost their practical power when in 1664, by a private arrangement between Archbishop Sheldon and Lord Clarendon, the clergy waived the privilege of taxing themselves and consented to inclusion in the money bills of the House of Commons. Henceforth the Crown had no particular need of their meeting; and, in consequence of the fanatical party strife which characterised the meetings of the Canterbury Convocation during the reigns of William III and Anne, the prorogation in 1717 became a precedent which was followed until the middle of the nineteenth century. During that long interval the Convocations, though summoned to meet with the meeting of every new Parliament, were never allowed to transact business.

Another point remains to be considered. The right of Parliament to reject the Deposited Book cannot be questioned on legal grounds. But it must be remembered that the Restoration Parliament which passed the 1662 Book was a purely English assembly. The Act of Union with Scotland in 1707 introduced Scottish members into the Westminster Parliament, and, whilst safeguarding the position of the Scottish Church, provided no guarantees for the English Church. Similarly Pitt's Act of Union with Ireland in 1801 introduced a further novel element into the Parliament. In 1927, when the Deposited Book was rejected in the Commons, the Irish members voted upon a question which did not affect directly the Irish Episcopal Church (disestablished by Gladstone in 1869) and the Scottish representatives exercised a like influence on the fate of the measure. These circumstances must necessarily be remembered in considering the argument of Mr. Fawkes.

With his theoretical arguments for an establishment of religion one may readily agree. The most important consequence of such an establishment is that the possibility becomes practicable of having a resident clergyman in every village and independent civil unit throughout the country. This condition implies, of course, that the religion of the National Church shall be such as is acceptable in general to the majority of the people, so that nobody shall be outside the province of the clergyman, nor deprived of his ministrations except by his own refusal. This tradition still survives in rural districts, where the parish priest in many cases still visits Nonconformists during illness, and places his spiritual counsel at their service. Without an Establishment, the Episcopal Church, like its competitors, would soon find itself compelled to concentrate its clergy in places where the laity were sufficiently numerous and wealthy to provide for their maintenance, with the consequent withdrawal of parish priests from many rural centres. Historically the practice of Occasional Conformity was acceptable to the Dissenters, who intended by the practice to acknowledge the lawfulness of a National Church, with which they could communicate occasionally, though unable to conform to all its requirements. In the eighteenth century many foreign Calvinists expressly commended this course to English Nonconformists as being the least recognition they could give to the principle of an established Church.

But the situation has changed since the eighteenth century. In particular the Enabling Act of 1919 introduced a new relationship between Church and Parliament. It is useless to speculate as to the possible modifications which might have been made in that Act had the Parliament refused to pass a measure which it could not amend, and demanded the right to insert amendments. The fact remains that the Act was passed without

alteration; and of the measures presented by the Church Assembly to the Parliament previous to the Deposited Book only two were rejected: the Shrewsbury Bishopric Bill in the Lords and the Measure relating to City Churches in the Commons.

The Deposited Book, however, was of far greater importance than these other Bills. Its rejection has created a situation of extraordinary delicacy. It is not sufficient to say that the episcopate should simply recognise the defeat and withdraw the project for a generation. The constitution of the House of Commons has so changed that there is no possibility of its conversion into a handmaid of the Church of England. It would be futile to expect, for example, that a twentieth century Parliament should make grants at the national cost for the erection of churches. Nor is there any more reason to suppose that a Parliamentary purge on St. Bartholomew's Day, 1928, whereby all Anglo-Catholics were ejected from their benefices, would produce a sudden rally of the majority of the non-churchgoing population of the country to the Church of England. Nor is the argument concerning the unrepresentative character of the House of Laity in the Church Assembly at all convincing. The validity of the vote of any member of the House of Commons is not in the least wise affected by the circumstance that he may have been elected by a minority of his constituents in a three-cornered contest.

The truth of the situation would appear to be that an establishment of religion can only be maintained if forbearance is shown by both contracting parties. The Establishment has the nature of a concordat; and, however cordially we may acknowledge that the State must assert its superiority over all sectional societies, whether Churches or Trade Unions, this superiority must not be converted into a dictatorship if the concordat is to be observed. In response to the rejection of the Deposited Book the Episcopate has introduced some very considerable changes into the revised Book. The Dean of Arches has given his opinion that these alterations are of great substance. Is it too much to hope that the House of Commons, recognising the meaning of this fact, will now reverse its former vote and accept the Bill? To the Church of England disestablishment would be a grave, almost catastrophic, blow. To the nation it would mean the abandonment of the historic ideal of a resident parochial clergy throughout the country. It is earnestly to be desired that such a disaster may not befall either Church or State. There seems to be no sufficient reason for embarking upon such a policy. But the moderation which has been exercised by the Episcopate since its rebuff must be accompanied by a reasonableness on the part of Parliament. Defiance will not promote the cause of peace. If Jerusalem is to be built as a city that is at unity in itself, a spirit of tolerance must be shown by all parties. It is earnestly to be hoped that the constitutional conservatism of the English people will prevail to preserve the historic Establishment.

NORMAN SYKES.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Jew and Christianity (H. B. Danby, D.D. Sheldon Press: 3/6) contains a course of lectures dealing mainly with the Jewish attitude to our Lord 'as it appears in certain Jewish expressions of opinion which were meant only for Jewish ears.' Dr. Danby complains that the whole subject is unattractive, but he has succeeded in making this little survey an interesting one. And it has this special interest, that it comes from the pen of one who has lived in the closest touch with the Jews and has made it his life-work to understand the standpoint of modern Judaism. These five lectures

deal with successive periods of history, and in explaining the development or change of Jewish opinion Dr. Danby shows Christian history in a very poor light. 'To the Jews Christianity, whenever it rose to activity, was too often an evil dream experienced in fact. To murder Jews even became a laudable Christian practice; to hate the Jew became a Christian virtue' (p. 62). Perhaps in his effort to be fair to the Jewish point of view he has occasionally been a little harsh to the other side. For example, he represents the early sixteenth century quarrel associated with the names of Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn as a contest of Reuchlin and the Humanists against 'the organised Church struggling to maintain its authority.' And, he adds, 'in the end the Pope condemned Reuchlin on principle' (p. 51). But this is misleading. Each enquiry to which Reuchlin was concerned resulted in a judgment in his favour; and though Leo X feared the Dominicans too much to give Reuchlin a decisive acquittal, he at any rate silenced the disputants by his *Mandatum de supersedendo* and is reported to have privately guaranteed the safety of the fearless Hebraist. The latter had too many friends in the Church itself for his cause to fail. However, this is a minor criticism of a useful book.

Any book dealing with the beginnings of Christianity tends to be coloured by the preconceptions of the writer. *Christianity in the Making* (S. H. Hooke, M.A., B.D. Methuen & Co.: 3/6) certainly avoids the orthodox preconceptions, but its standpoint is summed up by the author's view that 'the essence of religion lies in the fact that it is the embodiment in practices and beliefs of the desires of men' (p. 110). There is little that is new in this study, which presents Christ as little more than an apocalyptic visionary. The references of Jesus to Messiah and Son of Man were proleptic and the disciples, fascinated by His promises, were only temporarily rebuffed by the Crucifixion. Some time later Peter remembered the powers of healing which the Master had once taught him, and the success of an experiment on a lame man enabled him to rally the disciples, who, convinced now that Jesus was risen, built up a Jewish sect of those loyal to the Master. In opposition to this, and stressing the freedom from the Law which Jesus had proclaimed, arose the Gentile-Christian Church fostered by Paul and the Hellenists. There is much that is undeniably true in this and it is worked out in a clear and scholarly way; but, besides frequent exaggeration, there is much that is conjectural. Thus, Christ's mission to Jerusalem was due to a realisation of His past failure and of the need of some more drastic action of faith to precipitate the coming of the Kingdom. Again the appearance of the Risen Lord to Peter was 'a conviction that Jesus was still alive'; that to Paul was a 'blinding insight.' Mr. Hooke cannot find more than this because of his own assumptions: 'for he that cometh to God must believe that He is.' But because of this non-theistic standpoint his treatment of the first century is likely to provoke thought.

Of preconceptions and colour there is plenty in the last two volumes of *Foundations of Faith* (W. E. Orchard, D.D. Vol. 3, Ecclesiastical; Vol. 4, Eschatological. Allen & Unwin: 5/- each). Dr. Orchard is fascinated by the Roman Church like a moth drawn to the electric light—and much of his apologetic consists in explaining the spiral recoil which he and other Protestants have made from it. One seems to know in advance of each chapter the position which, after much ingenious argument, he will reach. Thus in Vol. 3, which deals with the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the Church, he finds the doctrine of the Trinity clearly expressed in the New Testament; the confusion between the Persons is only apparent—'they are

so alike in Person as to be interpretative of one another.' Rome is the true Church, though 'all orthodox believers and professors of the Catholic and Apostolic faith really belong to her.' And in defending the Authority of the Church he contends that 'Reason, Scripture, Christ, and the Church agree together and confirm one another.' And if this authority conflicts with a man's conscience? Fortunately 'the teaching of the Roman Church is perfectly clear on this issue; it says he must follow his conscience and his religious experience' (p. 95). We must add that it was thoughtful of the Roman Church to establish the Inquisition to help him to do this.

Vol. 4 deals with Eschatological doctrine and the various chapters are concerned with Immortality, Judgement, Heaven, Hell, the Parousia, etc. In all there is the same contempt for scientific revaluation of doctrine and belief. We are to look for a 'stupendous universal event which shall reunite body and soul through the resurrection of the body . . . ': the coming of Jesus 'on the clouds of heaven' is a process developing through the crises in history to a decisive issue and glorious consummation in the Last Advent. We admire the sincerity of Dr. Orchard, but can find little else for praise here.

Of a quite different order and appeal is *In Search of a Personal Creed* (J. D. M. Rorke. S.C.M. : 4/- & 2/6). This book is best suited for a study-circle or at any rate for those who are prepared to follow it step by step, adding much thought of their own. The author begins at rock-bottom and elaborates his creed (or rather, 'confession of faith') by an examination of reality from the standpoint of personal experience. Thus, while along one avenue of truth, we sum up our experience best by thinking of God as Creator and Father, along another avenue or in a different region we become aware of God as Indwelling Spirit; and in our valuation of Jesus and his work these truths become related. There is much helpful illustration and constructive thinking here. The writer does not always carry conviction, especially when he occasionally becomes curiously dogmatic, but he does provoke thought. Occasionally he is guilty of slip-shod English, but he can rise, for example, to an eloquent treatment of the Parable of the Prodigal Son in illustrating the meaning for himself of Christ's Divinity (pp. 149-152).

The object of *The Christianity of the Epistles* (A. W. Robinson, D.D. S.C.M. : 3/6 & 2/6) is to correct the fragmentary understanding which we gain of our New Testament from hearing portions of it read as lectures, by helping the student to appreciate the message of an epistle considered as a whole. Eight epistles are chosen—Galatians, Romans, Ephesians, Colossians, James, I Peter, Hebrews, and I John; and the effort is made not only to place each in its historical setting, but also to relate its message to the needs of to-day.

A sixth revised edition of *Sadhu Sundar Singh* (Mrs. Arthur Parker. S.C.M. : 5/- & 3/6) has been issued by the S.C.M. The work of this modern prophet and mystic is not only fascinating but inspiring; it would be incomplete to say that the significance of his work lies in his presentation of the Gospel to India in an Indian way; rather he is presenting the Gospel to a wider circle than this—by living it. No one, we feel, will follow the course of his ministry from his conversation—which involved the renunciation of relatives, wealth, and home—through all his amazing adventures as he travelled to farthest East and farthest West, without experiencing something of the persuasiveness and power of his appeal. Apart from noticing a misprint on p. 203, where 'Ridley Hall' should be 'Ripon Hall,' we give this little book an unqualified recommendation.

John Bunyan (R. H. Coats, M.A., S.C.M. : 4/- & 2/6) provides a short but vivid description and a critical estimate of the life and work of the Bedford zealot. It has much of interest to say about the style and the appeal of Bunyan's books, while it gives one a glimpse of many sides of his life not hitherto well-known. It has the merit, too, of being impartial.

J.P.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE NEED FOR SIMPLICITY OF DICTION AND DOCTRINE.

SIR,

Most Modernist writers seem to make their appeal far too exclusively to the philosophic mind, and the article on 'Constructive Modernism' is therefore all the more welcome, as it professes to be addressed to 'the man in the street.' But even in this article within the first few lines the writer uses the word 'dichotomy' and later writes: 'The charge of vagueness does not trouble the Modernist much . . . His soteriology, for example, is often large and indefinite.' Now 'dichotomy' and 'soteriology' are not words that the man in the street uses—and they put him off. He does not care for articles which he can only read with a dictionary by his side, and it cannot be claimed that such words are indispensable for the purpose. It is just the average man, however, who is really most in need of something definite, when the old familiar fundamentalist ideas are being discussed and tested.

The article makes a very strong appeal, but one which is surely incomplete as a statement of the Gospel message. Having accomplished his purpose of stating 'the fundamental part of the message,' . . . 'the doctrine of God, the doctrine of man, and Jesus Christ the Interpreter of both, the writer sums up by the following words :—

> 'To the Modernist the "Gospel trumpet sound" is the call to a great adventure : to fill life with a great purpose : it is the appeal to all that is most manly in manhood for loyalty and love and self-forgetfulness and service.'

But we must not stop here : if we wish to succeed in the Great Adventure we must avail ourselves of the promised 'power to become sons of God.' I feel I want to quote largely from Seeley's *Ecce Homo* and recall his distinction between 'a virtuous man' and 'a holy man'; and also between John Wesley's 'servant of God' and 'son of God.' I think one of the most important sentences in the article is one almost casually introduced in the paragraph dealing with soteriology as the Modernist sees it. Man, he says, shall be 'saved from selfishness and sin, and enabled to make response to the upward calling of God,' and *'he sees both the incentive and the power for this in the Christ of Calvary, and the indwelling Christ or Holy Spirit of experience.'*

That is the point we need to stress. Having heard the trumpet-call we need to realise that the power may be ours to respond to it. Like the early disciples, we must consciously rely on the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ to transform us, as it transformed them. 'The earliest Christians . . . regarding the ardour they felt as an express inspiration, or spiritual presence of God within them . . . consistently called the inspiring power, the Spirit of Holiness or the Holy Spirit' . . . 'This is the absolute and ultimate test of true membership in the Christian commonwealth.' . . . 'The Christian Law is the Spirit of Christ, that enthusiasm of humanity which He declared to be the source from which all right action flows' (*Ecce Homo*). Let us cease from saying the Holy Spirit is the Third *Person* in

the Godhead. The Holy Spirit is the Personal Presence of God (literally the Breath of God), or the Immanence of God. In a special sense to us who are inheritors in the Kingdom of Heaven the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us.

In support of this I should like to quote the words of some well-known living preachers and writers.

> 'Surely in experience it is not possible for anyone to differentiate between Christ and the Holy Spirit. They are one and the same Fact of Spiritual experience, and it is better to say so.'
>
> 'Christ identified Himself with His Spirit . . . The other Comforter was obviously Himself in spiritual influence and in-dwelling.'
>
> 'The one article in the Creed which seems to gain a deeper and fuller meaning as the others fade is "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life . . ." More people than the churches know of are, I believe, building for themselves a religion on this foundation.'

The late Miss Alice Gardner wrote :—

> 'It always seems to be that the doctrine of God as Spirit, and of the Indwelling Christ, who can only be spiritually conceived, while it has been in all ages a prominent part of Christianity to some Christians, is now almost the whole of it to many.'

The theology of Jesus Christ was very simple, and that of the Early Church was equally so. The simple is not the shallow, however; the simple is the sublime, and 'Simplicity is the true note of a true theology.' All the early writers in the Church identify the Spirit and the Logos, and in the article on 'The Older Theology,' in a recent number of the *Modern Churchman*, it is shown that the Alexandrian theology 'sees in the Logos doctrine of St. John the key to harmonize all truth.' . . . 'With the Deity immanent in all his works in and through the Logos all proceeds in orderly evolution.'

It was only later that the confusion arose of regarding the Spirit as a distinct Person, and Modernists can render a service to the Church, the effect of which it would be difficult to over-estimate, by clearing away this cause of confusion and, in the words of the writer of the article last quoted, provide 'a theology which can be the guide and inspiration of life to the learned and the simple alike; and which will lead men back to the Simplicity which is in Christ Jesus.'

H. E. EDMONDS.

ROMANISTS AND INTER-COMMUNION.

SIR,

I thought when reading the report of the Malines Conversations how very far away were the subjects discussed from the Modernist attitude towards Re-union. But the relevant matter in the last issue of the *Modern Churchman* sets me wondering whether I have mistaken this attitude. I am venturing therefore to set forth my own position very briefly, not because it has any interest or importance in itself, but because I have a real desire to know whether or not it does at all represent what is in the minds of fellow-Modernists. I would offer 're-union' on my part to all who, knowing my fundamentals, feel that they do not prevent an approach together to God's presence, whether in the Holy Communion or otherwise.

In explaining my position to Roman Catholics I would say that for my part questions of the Papacy do not appear to concern religion. They are matters of a political nature, similar in kind to questions of Episcopacy, and do not affect *faith*. However fiercely I may oppose their political implications, they do not prevent me from being in religious communion with Roman Catholics.

Again, with much dogma, such as that of the Immaculate Conception, these seem to me matters of speculation in which we need not desire to change one another's opinions, seeing that they do not affect the fundamentals of religion.

'These fundamentals'—I should say to my Roman Catholic friends—'seem to me wholly concerned with our view of the *Character of God*. If (whether from holding all parts of the Bible to be of the same value as revelations of God's will and character or from whatever other cause) you believe that God approves of religious persecution, of condemnation for heresy or for lack of Baptism, of punishment for sins due to heredity, or to environment, then I must confess that you and I worship a different God. Even so, I would not refuse to share the Eucharist with you, if, *knowing my view* of God and God's will, you gave me that invitation or accepted mine.'

I am unable to see how a Modern Churchman can offer more (or less) than this towards Re-union. C.G.

Harpenden.
8th March, 1928.

[We cannot answer for other Modernists, but, speaking for ourselves, we are in general agreement with our correspondent. Of course for all Roman Catholics the Papacy is an important article of the Faith, and if you have a logical mind the Immaculate Conception does affect the fundamentals of religion for it touches the Character of God. The Romanists' answer to our correspondent would be very simple: 'We cannot go to Mass with you, and you must not come to Mass with us.'—Ed., *M.C.*]

THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION LONDON MEETING.

Sir,

I should be glad if you would kindly give me the opportunity of calling the attention of your readers, whether members of the Union or not, to the Annual Meetings of the Union, which will be held on Wednesday, June 13th, in London.

11.30 a.m. Holy Communion at St. Andrew's Church, Ashley Place (close to Victoria Station).
Preacher: The Rev. L. Elliott Binns, D.D.

3.0 p.m. The Annual Meeting of the Union. (Members only.) Church House, Westminster.
The Rev. R. G. Griffith, M.A., will open a discussion on *Modernism as an Evangelistic Force.*

6.0 p.m. Annual Public Meeting in Caxton Hall, Westminster.
The President (the Very Rev. the Dean of St. Paul's) will take the Chair.
Subject: *Church and State.*
Speakers: G. G. Coulton, Esq., D.Litt.
Sir Martin Conway, M.P.
The Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D.
(No tickets required.)

All are invited to attend the Sermon and Holy Communion and the evening public meeting.

T. J. Wood
(*Organizing Secretary of the Churchmen's Union*).

The Church House,
Westminster, S.W.1.
25th April, 1928.